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RETHINKING THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception,' the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
has been the subject of much controversy.2 The Fifth Circuit's
recent adoption of a "good faith exception" to the rule 3 has
sparked the most recent round of debate.4 In United States v.
'Although the Supreme Court held as early as 1886 that the exclusion from
the trier of fact of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments was an appropriate remedy, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
its early exclusionary rule cases were heavily influenced by the fear that the evi-
dence in question may have been unreliable or the result of compulsion in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. It was not until
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), that the Court relied solely on the
fourth amendment to bar, in a federal prosecution, the use of evidence that was
seized illegally. And it was not until the 1961 landmark decision of Mapp v.
Oh:o, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the. Court held that the fourteenth amendment
fully incorporated the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and thereby held that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment was inadmissible in a state court. 367 U.S. at 655. For a useful
treatment of the history of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, see Schroeder,
Deterring Fourth Amendment Violat'ons: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule,
69 CEo. L.J. 1361, 1363-70 (1981).
The focus of this Comment is on the exclusionary rule as applied to evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. The analysis contained herein
does not apply to evidence obtained in violation of the fifth or other amendments,
mainly because the reliability of such evidence may be in question, whereas the
reliability of evidence obtained contrary to fourth amendment dictates is not.
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath oraffirmation', and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2As Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1361 n.2, has indicated, there are at least
two books substantially or completely devoted to a discussion of the exclusionary
rule, and literally hundreds of articles have been written on the rule and its effects,
including one article written just on the commentary. See 1 W. LAFA E, A
TREATISE o.4 Tm FounTH AMENDMENT (1978); S. ScmLSINGER, ExcLusloNARsY
INJUsTICE (1977); Note, Trends in Legal Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule,
65 J. Caim. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 373 (1974). In fact, Schroeder observes, the
1980 Index to Legal Periodicals added the heading "Exclusionary Rule" to its
subject index, a reflection of the voluminous amount of commentary on the sub-
ject. Commentators are in sharp disagreement on almost every issue surrounding
the rule, and judicial debate on the rule has been described euphemistically as
"warm." See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 466 (1976).
3See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840-47 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). For a detailed discussion of Williams,
see infra text accompanying notes 80-111.
4 Numerous articles and notes recently have been written about the good
faith exception in general or about the Williams decision and its implications.
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Williams,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
sitting en banc,6 held that henceforth in .the Fifth Circuit "evidence
is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is
discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good
faith and in the -reasonable, though mistaken, belief, that they are
authorized." 7
In the wake of Williams, several other federal and state courts
have adopted or indicated a willingness to adopt. some form of good
faith exception in search and seizure cases.. Among these are United
States District Courts in the Southern District of New Yorks and
the Western District of Pennsylvania,9 the Supreme Courts of
Arizona,' Colorado,"1 and Virginia,' 2 the New York Court of Ap-
See, e.g., Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CGum. L. & CrImNoLoGY 635 (1978); Mertens
& Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating
the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981); Schroeder, supra
note 1, at 1412-21; Case Comment, Constitutional Law: The Fifth Circu.t's "Good
Faith" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule-Well Reached or Over-Reached?, 33
U. FLA. L. REv. 300 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Florida Case Comment]; Case
Comment, Exclusionary Rule's Good Faith Exception-The Fifth Circu.t's Ap-
proach in United States v. Williams, 15 GA. L. REv. 487 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Georgia Case Comment]; Recent Development, Limiting the Applicaton
of the Exclusionary Rule: The Good Faith Exception, 34 V -wD. L. REv. 213, _216
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Vanderbilt Recent Development]; Recent Develop-
ments, Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure--The Role of Police Offlcer. Good
Faith in Substantive Fourth Amendment Doctrine-Michigan v. DeFillippo, 55
WAsH. L. RPv. 849 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Washington Recent Develop-
ments].
5622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981).
G Although the Williams court was sitting en bane, the opinion that created
the "good faith exception" was the second of two majority opinlions, and was
joined by only 13 of the 24 members of the court. See infra text accompanying
notes 96-98.
7 622 F.2d at 840.
sSee United States v. Wyler, 502 F. Supp. 969, 973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(house search that revealed identity of key witness was unlawful, but because
information about the witness was only a by-product of the search and the search
was undertaken in the good faith belief that it was lawful, the technical illegality
of the search does not taint the testimony of the key witness so as to invoke appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule).
9See United States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386, 396-400 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
(explicitly adopts Williams-type good faith exception, and holds that whether or
not exigent circumstances justified officer's warrantless search of motel room, evi-
dence seized should not be suppressed because it was obtained pursuant to good
faith and reasonable belief that action taken was lawful).
10 See State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 402, 636 P.2d 637, 650 (1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1638 (1982) (although photographs of murder scene were taken
illegally without obtaining a warrant, they are admissible because officer who took
photos acted on legal advice-of county attorney-that he did not realize to be
incorrect).
"1See People v. Eichelberger, 620 P.2d 1067, 1071 n.2 (Colo. 1980) (en
bane) (cites Williams for proposition that reasonable police actions, as opposed
to willful or flagrant actions, are not intended to be penalized by the exclusionary
rule).
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peals, 13  and intermediate- appellate courts in Illinois14 and
_Kentucky. 15 In addition, Congress is presently considering legisla-
tion that would. incorporate ,the concept of good faith into the
exclusionary rule.16  Finally, the list of jurists and commentators
who have argued in favor -of some form of good faith exception
is formidable.
17
, See Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, 950, 275 S.E.2d 620, 622
(1981) (although good faith exception not applied to prevent suppression of
evidence seized pursuant to a defective warrant, court finds the logic of Williams
and other judicial advocates of a good faith exception for warrantless searches
to. be persuasive).
13See People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 9-11, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541-42, 439
N.Y.S.2d 877, 881-83 (1981) (evidence obtained by warrantless search should
not be suppressed because officers acted in good faith, reasonable belief that they
had received valid consent to search even though consenter had no authority to
consent to the search of apartment where evidence was found).
24 See People v. Pierce, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1102, 1110, 411 N.E.2d 295,
301, 307 (1980) (because police actions taken as a whole met the good faith/
reasonableness test set forth in Williams, confession was not tainted by search
pursuant to a quashed warrant).
15See Richmond v. Commonwealth, No. 80-1366 (Ky. Ct. App. July 31,
1981) (capsulized in 50 U.S.L.W. 2162-63 (Sept. 22, 1981)) (unnecessary to
decide whether magistrate could issue warrant authorizing search outside of his
jurisdictional territory, because police officer acted in good faith reliance on other-
wise valid warrant and magistrate acted without bad faith, the evidence seized
pursuant to warrant should not be suppressed, as suppression would have no
deterrent effect).
16See S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S154 (daily ed. Jan. 15,
1981). S. 101 would prohibit the suppression of evidence in a federal criminal
proceeding unless the evidence-seizing officer's conduct violated the fourth amend-
ment in an intentional or substantial way. S. 101, § 3505(a). In addition, the
United States Attorney General has publicly advocated that legislation incorporat-
ing the concept of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule be adopted as
part of the Reagan Administration's anti-crime effort. See ATTORNEY GENEI 's
TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRImE, FNAL REPORT 55-56 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
ATr'Y GEN.'S RPT.I.
17 As discussed infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text, several Supreme
Court Justices have advocated the adoption of some form of good faith exception.
In addition, at least two prominent judges on the United States Courts of Appeals
have spoken in favor of a good faith exception. See Virgin Islands v. Rasool,
657 F.2d 582, 593-96 (3d Cir. 1981) (Adams, J., concurring) (where police
officers have not engaged in clear misconduct or an unreasonable search, evidence
should not be suppressed); H. FRIENDLY, BENCHm~ms, 260-62 (1967) (Judge
Henry Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
suggests that suppression should be limited to the fruits of activity intentionally
or unreasonably illegal; see also United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 451-52
(2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting)). Several commentators also have sug-
gested that a good faith exception be adopted. See, e.g., E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH
AN SErzuRE: A D.EmmrA OF THE SUPREME CoURT 58 (1975) (officer should
be supported if he acted decently and did "what you would expect a good,
careful conscientious police officer to do under the circumstances"); Weber, Good
Faith of Peace Officers in Search and Seizure: Seeking Proper Limits to the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 53 Los ANGEE.s B.J. 307 (1977) (good faith exception is appropri-
ate in circumstances where purposes of the exclusionary rule are not undermined);
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TFx. L. Rlv.
736, 745 (1972) ("the criminal should go free if the constable has flouted the
fourth amendment but not if he has made an honest blunder"); Note, The Good
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The arguments advanced in favor of the good faith exception
are relatively simple. First, its proponents point out, the Supreme
Court has held that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally
compelled, but is a judicially created remedy1 s designed solely to
deter law enforcement officials from engaging in- conduct violative
of the fourth amendment.19 Evidence must not be suppregsed,
therefore, unless suppression will have a deterrent effect,20 especially
Faith Exception and Its Basis in Reason, 12 LiNco.. L. RFv. 31 (1981); Skolnick,
When the Constable Blunders--or Worse, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1982, Part II at
5, col. 1; see also Ball, supra note 4, at 657 (good faith exception may be justified
by "history, precedent, and policy. However, it should not be adopted without
careful consideration of [its effects]."); Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1421 (most
objections to adoption of good faith exception can be met, and support for execp-
tion's adoption continues to build).
18 See, e.g., Rasool, 657 F.2d at 594 (Adams, J., concurring); William, 622
F.2d at 841. The contention that the exclusionary rule is properly viewed as a
judicially created remedy is strongly supported by current Supreme Court precedent,
see, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) ("The exclusionary rule was a
judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-
ment"); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("In sum,,the rule
is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right
of the party aggrieved." (footnote omitted)).
19 See, e.g., Williams, 622 F.2d at 841-42; Adams, 53 N.Y.2d at 9, 422 N.E.2d
at 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 881. Support for the argument that the sole purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct is found in Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) ("The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
unlawful police action."); Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 ("The primary justification for
the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth
Amendment rights. . . . [T]he nile is not a personal constitutional right. It is
not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or
seizure ...."); Janis, 428 U.S. at 446 ("The Court ... has established that the
'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police
conduct."'); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48 (Court cites prior exclusionary rule
cases, and interprets them as establishing that the rule's purpose is to deter).
2 0 See, e.g., Williams, 622 F.2d at 842; Adams, 53 N.Y.2d at 9, 422 N.E.2d
at 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 881. The Supreme Court's refusal to apply the exclu-
sionary rule in contexts where its deterrent effect would be limited supports this
assertion. See, e.g., DeFillfppo, 443 U.S. at 38 n.3 (evidence seized pursuant to a
presumptively valid statute later declared unconstitutional should not be sup-
pressed because suppression would have no conceivable deterrent effect); Stone,
428 U.S. at 493-95 (where state provided fair trial, state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on ground that unconstitutionally obtained
evidence was introduced at trial, for exclusion of evidence at that late stage would
have minimal, if any, deterrent effect); Janis, 428 U.S. at 454 (exclusion from
federal civil proceedings of evidence seized illegally by state law enforcement
officer would not have enough deterrent effect to outweigh societal costs of ex-
clusion); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (suppression of
evidence obtained in reliance on subsequently invalidated precedent would have
no deterrent effect, so exclusionary rule should not apply); Calandra, 414 U.S. at
351-52 (any incremental deterrent effect that might occur by exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence from grand jury proceedings does not justify extension of the
exclusionary rule to cover such proceedings); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) (the additional deterrence benefits of extending the
exclusionary rule to defendants other than the victim of the illegal search are too
insignificant to justify such an extension in light of strong countervailing considera-
tions).
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considering that exclusion of probative evidence can cause the re-
lease of dangerous and clearly guilty criminals, thus imposing high
costs upon society. Second, exclusion of evidence obtained by well
trained police officers who acted in a mistaken, but reasonable,
good faith belief that their conduct comported with fourth amend-
ment requirements has no deterrent effect.21 The law in this area
is unclear and constantly in a state of flux. 22 A court's after-the-fact
determination that an officer's good faith conduct was constitution-
ally impermissible will cause even the ideal officer to do nothing
more than he has already done-namely, to engage in an informed,
good faith effort to gather evidence in a manner consistent with the
requirements of the fourth amendment.23  Suppression hence ac-
complishes nothing positive, yet it causes reliable evidence to be
kept from the trier of fact, thus substantially impairing the truth-
finding process, 24-sometimes permitting the release of dangerous
criminals 25-and causing the public to lose faith in the criminal
justice system.
26
Opponents of a Williams-type good faith exception generally
concede that, at least under current Supreme Court doctrine, the
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy whose purpose is
to deter unconstitutional police conduct.27 In contrast to good
21 See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting) ("When law en-
forcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable
grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is later excluded, the exclusion can
have no deterrent effect."); Williams, 622 F.2d at 842; Wyler, 502 F. Supp. at
974; Pierce, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 1102, 1110, 411 N.E.2d at 301, 307; Wright, supra
note 17, at 740 ("A police officer will not be deterred from an illegal search if
he does not know that it is illegal."); see also Janis, 428 U.S. at 459 n.35 ("[Tihe
officers here were clearly acting in good faith . . . a factor that the Court has
recognized reduces significantly the potential deterrent effect of exclusion.").
22As Professor Anthony Amsterdam has pointed out in a most understated
manner: "For clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the
Supreme Court's most successful product." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MmTN. L. Thv. 349 (1974).
23 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 539-40 (White, J., dissenting) (when officer acts
reasonably and in good faith, he has acted as he should, and exclusion "can in
no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his
duty.").
24 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 490-91, 490 n.29; see also Schroeder, supra note 1,
at 1382-85.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See, e.g., Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 385-86; Florida Case
Comment, supra note 4, at 304; Vanderbilt Recent Development, supra note 4,
at 218; Washington Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 853-55. Given the
strong Supreme Court precedents cited supra notes 18-19, it is not surprising that
even the harshest critics of exclusionary rule exceptions concede that the Court
currently views the rule as a judicially created remedy designed solely to deter
unlawful police conduct. As Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 385 n.100,
have demonstrated, the Court in Janis essentially defined out of existence the
[Vol. 130:1610
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION-
faith exception proponents, however, opponents aigue that a proper
understanding of the way exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
affects the entire .law enforcement system reveals that the suppres-
sion of even "good faith" evidence may deter future unconstitu-
tional conduct.
28
The gist of the argument against the exception is as follows:
If a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is adopted, courts
will shift their focus away from the question whether the police
acted constitutionally and toward an examination of whether they
acted reasonably and in good faith. The development of *fourth
amendment law will then "stop dead in its tracks" 29 as courts forgo
original justification for the rule-preservation of judicial integrity-by making it
coextensive with the deterrence rationale. The Janis Court stated:
The primary meaning of "judicial integrity" in the context of evidentiary
rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the
Constitution.... The focus therefore must be on the question whether
the admission of the evidence encourages violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights. As the Court has noted in recent cases, this inquiry is
essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a
deterrent purpose.
428 U.S. at 458 n.35.
That critics of the good faith exception and other restrictions on the scope
of the exclusionary rule generally recognize how the Court currently views the
rule does not, however, mean that they accept the Court's current assertion that
the rule is a judicially created remedy designed solely to deter unlawful police
conduct. To the contrary, the debate over the rule's origin and purpose is a
particularly "warm one." Id. 466. Justices Brennan and Marshall continue to
assert that the exclusionary rule is not a judicially created remedy but is constitu-
tionally mandated, and that its central purpose is to preserve judicial integrity.
See, e.g., Peltier, 422 U.S. at 553 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
J.); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 355-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas &
Marshall, JJ.).
Several commentators have agreed with Justices Brennan and Marshall that a
proper understanding of the rule's origins reveals that it springs directly from the
fourth amendment and therefore must be applied in all cases in which even the
slightest constitutional violation has occurred. See, e.g., Cann & Egbert, The
Exclusionary Rule: Its Necessity in Constitutional Democracy, 23 How. L.J. 299
(1980); Kamisar, A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 Cans. L. BuLL. 5
(1979); see also Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Consti-
tut'onal Common Law, 89 Hazv. L. REv. 1 (1975) (exclusionary rule is part of a
constitutional common law); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclu-
sionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MmnN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
Of course, if the rule is, in fact, properly viewed as being constitutionally man-
dated, then exclusion would be required in any case in which there had been a
constitutional violation, and a good faith exception, no matter how it is structured,
would be unconstitutional. See Ball, supra note 4, at 651.
2sAlthough it was written before Williams was decided, probably the most
cogent criticism of the principle of permitting the use of evidence because of a
police officer's "good faith" is contained in Justice Brennan's dissent in Peltier,
422 U.S. at 550-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan characterized his
dissent as a demonstration that even if the deterrence rationale is accepted, the
Peltier principle-which permits the use of good faith evidence-will have dis-
astrous results. Id. 554 n.13.
29Peltier, '422 U.S. at 554-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Mertens &
Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 450-53.
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articulation in new situations of such fourth amendment require-
ments as probable cause, and instead decide the issue of suppression
by determining simply whether the officer involved acted 'reason-
ably and in good- faith." 30 Without the continuing articulation
of fourth amendment requirements, police officers in the future will
have no guidance on how to act in borderline situations previously
considered by courts, which will have engaged only in a good faith
analysis. Over time, as evidence is admitted in every case in which
a court thinks the police acted reasonably, the standards for com-
pliance with the fourth amendment will become fuzzier and more
diluted than at present.3 ' Further, because such concepts as "good
faith" and "reasonableness" are vague,32 courts will spend inordi-
nate time and effort in determining whether police acted "reason-
ably and in good faith," 33 and will ultimately decide the suppres-
sion issue on subjective and inarticulable grounds. The result will
be that the good faith "exception" will gut the exclusionary rule
and the fourth amendment, and the police will be able to violate
the true, though unarticulated, requirements of the fourth amend-
ment without consequence.
Despite the adoption of the good faith exception by the Fifth
Circuit and the other courts listed above,34 and despite the raging
debate over the wisdom of the exception, 35 the Supreme Court has
not yet squarely addressed the issue. In a recent decision, Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, noted in passing that the Court
has not, "[t]o date," recognized the good faith exception.36 Such
dictum leaves open the possibility that an exception will be adopted
in the future. Indeed, several commentators have speculated that
the present Court will soon adopt some type of good faith excep-
30See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 452-53; Vanderbilt Recent
Development, supra note 4, at 228-29 & 228 n.121.
31 See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 449, 453; Georgia Case Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 502; Vanderbilt Recent Development, supra note 4, at
228-29.
32 See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 447; Georgia Case Comment,
supra note 4, at 502, Vanderbilt Recent Development, supra note 4, at 229-30;
see also infra text accompanying notes 103-12.
33 Specifically, it has been argued that determination of the officer's subjec-
tive and objective good faith would deflect the court's inquiry from the guilt of the
defendant to the culpability of the police, and would require an additional layer of
difficult fact-finding. See, e.g., Peltier, 422 U.S. at 560-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Kaplan, The.Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1045 (1974);
Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 448-49.
34 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
35 See supra notes 4 & 17; text accompanying notes 18-26, 28-33.
36 Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664, 2669 (1982).
[Vol. 130:1610
GOOD FAITH. EXCEPTION
tion.37  Chief Justice Burger 38 and Justices White,39 Powell,40 and
Rehnquist 4l have already announced their support for some form
of good faith exception. Justice Blackmun 42 has indicated that
the good faith and reasonableness of an officer should play at least
some role in determining whether to suppress evidence he gathered.
Although Justice O'Connor has not yet addressed the issue explicitly,
she seems generally sympathetic to the arguments of those who
would reduce the scope of the exclusionary rule.4 3 These six Justices
3
7See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 370-71; Note, Impending
Frontal Assault on the Citadel: The Supreme Court's Readiness to Modify the
Strict Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amendment to a Good Faith Standard, 12
TuLsA L.J. 337 (1976); cf. Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1416-17.
3sThe Chief Justice announced his distaste for the exclusionary rule in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting), in which he complained that "honest mistakes have been treated in the
same way as deliberate and flagrant ...violations of the Fourth Amendment," id.
418, a policy that he characterized as just as foolish as punishing the freeing
of a tiger in a schoolroom in the same way as the freeing of a mouse, id. 419.
Although Burger did not advocate the abolition of the exclusionary rule in Bivens
because he believed that no better alternative then existed, id. 420-21, he sug-
gested in Stone, 428 U.S. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring), that unless the rule
is abolished, preferable legislative alternatives will not be adopted. But he also
made reference in his Stone concurrence to Justice White's suggestion that the
rule be modified to incorporate the concept of good faith. Id. 501-02. This
reference, combined with his comments in Bivens, suggests that although the
Chief Justice prefers that the exclusionary rule be abandoned altogether, he would
be willing to support a good faith exception as a step in the right direction.
39 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 538-42 (White, J., dissenting) (explicitly advocating
the adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
40 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975) (Powell, J., with
Rehnquist, J., concurring in part) (when police have not engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct, the exclusionary rule should not apply).
41See id.; see also Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539 (Rehnquist, J.) ("'Where the
official action was pursued in complete good faith .. . the deterrence rationale
loses much of its force."') (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447
(1974) (Rehnquist, J.)).
425ee Janis, 428 U.S. at 458 n.35 (1976) (Blackmun, J.) (officer's good
faith significantly reduces the deterrent effect of exclusion, which in turn counsels
against exclusion).
43 In two major search and seizure cases during her first term, Justice O'Connor
joined the majority in holding for the government. See Washington v. Chrisman,
454 U.S. 1 (1982); United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). Further,
in United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982), Justice O'Connor joined
the dissent, which maintained that a recent fourth amendment decision should
not be applied retroactively to invalidate an arrest, partially because the officers
acted in good faith. The dissenters (Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice,
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor) cited United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531 (1975), in support of their contention that the exclusionary rule should not
be applied in Johnson because:
First, "if law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that
evidence they had seized was admissible at trial, the 'imperative of judicial
integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that ma-
terial." Second, a deterrence purpose can only be served when the evi-
dence to be suppressed is derived from -a search which the law, enforcement
1982]
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-Burger, White, Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and O'Connor-
recently voted to hear reargument on a fourth amendment case,
specifically requesting the parties to address the question whether
the exclusionary rule should be modified to incorporate some form
of a good faith exception.44 It thus appears that the Court is pre-
pared to confront the issue directly, and that a comprehensive modi-
fication of the exclusionary rule is imminent.
Given the Court's current posture, this Comment does not
simply join the ranks of those advocating either the acceptance or
rejection of the concept of a good faith exception. Instead, it is
assumed that the Supreme Court will adopt some form of excep-
tion.45  This Comment thus focuses on how such an exception
should be structured. A properly conceived good faith exception,
one that differs from the Williams exception, will permit the use
of "good faith evidence" while encouraging courts and law enforce-
ment officials to continue the development and articulation of
strong fourth amendment guidelines.
46
The principal contention of this Comment is that evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment should be admitted
under a good faith exception only if the officer whose conduct is in
question can prove that he acted pursuant to a specific and reason-
able institutional guideline.47  Police will be most effectively de-
terred from unconstitutional conduct if police departments respond
institutionally to search and seizure decisions by continually pro-
mulgating field regulations reflective of developing fourth amend-
ment law, and by training officers to follow such regulations.48 The
officers knew or should have known was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.
102 S. Ct. at 2595 (citation omitted).
During her nomination hearings, Justice O'Connor declined to comment
directly regarding her views on the good faith exception because she expected
the issue to confront the Court in the near future. See Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the judiciary, Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 143 (1981). She did note, however, that although the exclusionary rule should
be applied "if force or trickery or some other reprehensible conduct has been used ..
I have seen examples of the application of the rule which I thought were unfortu-
nate on the trial court." Id. 78.
44 See 51 U.S.L.W. 3145 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1982). The case restored to the
calendar for reargument was State v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887
(1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982) (No. 81-430) (argued Oct. 13,
1982). In Gates, the state challenges the suppression of evidence seized pursuant
to a search warrant issued after the police received an anonymous tip that was
partially corroborated.
45 See supra text accompanying notes 36-44.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 147-54, 233-69.
47 Id.
48 See infra text accompanying notes 117-46.
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heretofore absent incentive for the promulgation of such regulations
can be provided by permitting, under a good faith exception, the
use of evidence seized pursuant to such regulations.49 To ensure
that fourth amendment law will continue to be developed and
articulated, this Comment proposes that courts determine whether
an evidence-seizing officer's conduct was constitutional before de-
termining, under the new regulation-conscious good faith analysis,
whether suppression is the proper remedy.50
Part I of this Comment is a critical examination of the
Williams-type good faith exception. It argues that the courts that
have adopted the exception thus far have incompletely understood
how suppression of evidence deters unconstitutional conduct.5 '
After an examination of the Williams decision, it concludes that
the good faith exception as it currently exists will, as critics charge,
permit the police to stretch the contours of the fourth amendment
because court enforcement of its requirements will become weak,
arbitrary, and inconsistent. 5
2
Part II reiterates the arguments of several police scholars and
jurists that the exclusionary rule deters unconstitutional conduct
primarily because of its effect on the institutions that shape police
behavior.53 It is then argued that many of the problems with the
Williams-type good faith exception stem from the good faith courts'
narrow and incomplete understanding of how the exclusionary rule
deters improper conduct, and that any good faith exception should
be based upon an institutional, or systemic, view of deterrence.54
The basic contours of a new good faith exception formulated under
an institutional view of deterrence are then presented.55
Part III examines several Supreme Court and other cases in
which the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence has been
permitted because the police officers involved relied upon estab-
lished guidelines, even though those guidelines were later held to
be constitutionally defective. Although it is argued that some of
these cases were wrongly decided because the court did not properly
4 9 See infra text accompanying notes 148-50, 261-64.
50 The reformulated good faith exception advocated in this Comment requires
a court to determine, before undertaking its good faith inquiry, and independently
of all countervailing considerations, whether the conduct being challenged was
constitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 233, 236-38.
51 See infra text accompanying notes 74-77, 113-14.
52 See infra text accompanying notes 108-12.
53 See infra text accompanying notes 113-38.
54 See infra text accompanying notes 139-47.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 147-54.
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scrutinize the guidelines involved, it is suggested that the cases
examined provide some precedential support for the regulation-
conscious good faith exception proposed. 6
Part IV of this Comment proposes and explores a new regula-
tion-conscious good faith exception for search and seizure cases.
The structure of the proposed exception is laid out in detail 57 and
then examined to illustrate how the new exception would be ad-
ministered by the courts.5  The benefits of a regulation-conscious
good faith exception are discussed, and arguments against the adop-
tion of the proposed exception are confronted and rejected.59
I. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT FORMULATION OF THE
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
The exclusionary rule generally requires that evidence ob-
tained by law enforcement officers acting in violation of the fourth
amendment cannot be presented at trial against a criminal defend-
ant.60 The "good faith exception" permits the use of unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence in certain defined circumstances. Under
the exception, as generally articulated, unconstitutionally obtained
evidence "is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule when
it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in
good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they
are authorized." 61 This articulation of the good faith exception
by the Fifth Circuit 62 has been supported by Justice White,63 by
commentators,6 4 and by almost every court that has adopted a good
faith exception to date.65
56 See infra text accompanying notes 155-221.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
6 8 See infra text accompanying notes 236-64.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 265-69.
6 0 In its discussion of the origin and history of the exclusionary rule, the
Supreme Court stated in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961), that the rule
means, "quite simply, that 'conviction by means of unlawful seizures and coerced
confessions . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts .... ' and
that such evidence 'shall not be used at all.'" (citation omitted).
61 United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
62 See id.
63See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
64 See, e.g., Arr'y GEN.'s REP., supra note 16, at 56-57; E. Gmswo.u, supra
note 17, at 58; Ball, supra note 4, at 635; Note, supra note 17, at 31; Skolnick,
supra note 17.
65 See cases cited supra notes 8-15; see also Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657
F.2d 582, 595 (3d Cir. 1981) (Adams, J., concurring).
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As outlined above,66 the rationale for adopting the good faith
exception as articulated by the Williams court is fairly simple: The
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that should be ap-
plied only when its effect will be to deter unconstitutional con-
duct.6 7 "When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly,
but in good faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence
they have seized is later excluded, the exclusion can have. no deter-
rent effect." 68 Furthermore, the law should require only that
officers act as "reasonable officer[s] would and should act in similar
circumstances," 69 because to require more is unrealistic. Officers
can be expected to make mistakes on the street, 70 but it is wrong to
penalize, through suppression of probative evidence, those reason-
able mistakes that will happen under the best of circumstances.
The societal costs of exclusion are quite high,71 it is contended,
and the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the deterrent
effect of exclusion does not outweigh the societal costs 72-let alone
when exclusion has no deterrent effect at all.
7 3
In arguing that suppression of "good faith" evidence has no
deterrent effect, the proponents of the good faith exception im-
plicitly adopt what can be labelled a "narrow" view of deterrence.
Under such a "narrow" view, the exclusionary rule's effect is,
thought to be felt by the individual police officer whose evidence
has been suppressed 74 and by other street officers only through
reading the suppression decision and responding directly to the
fourth amendment principles pronounced therein.7 5 By arguing
that exclusion of "good faith evidence" has no deterrent effect, the
good faith exception courts do not recognize that suppression of
such evidence may have a significant long-term deterrent effect, as
law enforcement agencies respond institutionally to newly articu-
lated and enforced fourth amendment principles.76  Consistent with
6 6 See supra text accompanying notes 18-26.
67 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
68 Stone, 428 U.S. 540 (White, J., dissenting). See cases cited supra note 21.
69 Stone, 428 U.S. at 539-40 (White, J., dissenting).
7OSee Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
7 2 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-95; Williams, 622 F.2d at 843.
73 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting); Williams, 622 F.2d at
847.
74 This deterrent effect has also been labelled "special deterrence." See
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV.
665, 709-10 (1970).
75 Oaks, supra note 74, at 710-11, defines this type of deterrence as "direct
deterrence," one subcategory of what he labels "general deterrence."
76 See infra text accompanying notes 113-41.
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their "narrow" view of deterrence, courts that have adopted the
good faith exception have focused their good faith inquiry almost
exclusively on the behavior of the individual officer who seized the
evidence in question, and on how his or her behavior might be
affected by suppression."
In order to invoke the good faith exception under the Williams
test, it must be established by the prosecution that the evidence-
seizing officer's actions were taken in both subjective and objective
good faith.78 The officer must prove that he believed he was acting
constitutionally (subjective good faith), and it must be demonstrated
that the officer's belief was reasonable (objective good faith).79 The
Williams court suggested that good faith would have little meaning
if not based on objective criteria as well as subjective belief.80 It
is often impossible for a court to determine with certainty whether
a police officer in fact believed that he was acting constitutionally
when evidence was seized. Generally, the only evidence before the
court on the subjective good faith of the officer will be the officer's
77See, e.g., Williams, 622 F.2d at 842, 846 (officers who have made reason-
able attempt to act lawfully cannot be deterred by suppression from acting in same
manner in the future; agent in case acted reasonably and in good faith so sup-
pression can have no deterrent effect); United States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386,
399-400 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (close inspection of officer's actions reveals that he
acted reasonably and in good faith, so, because suppression would not deter
future police misconduct, the evidence should be admitted at trial); United States
v. Wyler, 502 F. Supp. 969, 973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (record in case established
that agents acted in good faith and reasonably; therefore, the deterrence purpose
of the exclusionary rule would not be advanced by suppression and evidence
was admitted); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541-42, 439
N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (1981) (purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter; there is no
deterrence when evidence obtained by police who believed they were acting law-
fully is suppressed, so because agents in case reasonably believed they had consent
to search apartment, evidence should not be suppressed). In addition, as one
commentator has noted, the Supreme Court has frequently adopted a narrow
view of deterrence, which has contributed to the Court's willingness to take indi-
vidual officer's good faith into account in determining whether to apply the ex-
clusionary rule. See Washington Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 854 n.32,
856-57; see, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974):
By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of [willful, or at the
very least negligent] conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular
investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of
care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pur-
sued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much
of its force.
(emphasis added.)
78 See Williams, 622 F.2d at 841 nn.4-4a, 844; see also Williams, 622 F.2d
at 848 (Hill, J., concurring specially).
79 Id.
80 See Williams, 622 F.2d 841 n.4a. See also People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d
1, 9-10, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (1981); Ball, supra note 4,
at 647.
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own testimony.81 One commentator has noted that "[s]uch testi-
mony, whether truthful or perjured, is almost impossible to re-
fute." 82 In fact, evidence suggests that the exclusionary rule al-
ready fosters false testimony by the police.8 3  Thus, although
subjective good faith must be proven to avoid suppression, it is
likely that this branch of the good faith test will almost always be
met.s4 The objective branch of the test thus becomes critical.
The Williams court, and other good faith courts and com-
mentators, recognize the importance of the objective branch of the
good faith test.85 Without the requirement that the evidence-
seizing officer's actions be "reasonable," as well as having been taken
in subjective good faith, a well-intentioned officer completely ig-
norant of the Constitution would never have his evidence sup-
pressed, no matter how egregious his actions. The Williams test
attempts to prevent this possibility through its "reasonableness"
requirement. The court stated, "a series of broadcast breakins [sic]
and searches carried out by a constable-no matter how pure in
heart-who had never heard of the fourth amendment could never
qualify" for application of the good faith exception.8 6 The impli-
cation is that the objective facet of the good faith exception is the
most important because it alone ensures that police conduct meets
certain fourth amendment standards.
It is argued below, however, that one serious flaw with the
"objective" test of the Williams-type good faith exception is that
courts are permitted to conclude that it has been passed without
providing principled reasons for their determinations. The narrow,
officer-specific inquiry into the "reasonableness" of an officer's con-
duct requires courts to make subjective and arbitrary determina-
tions that cannot be transformed into articulable and applicable
standards for future police conduct.8 7 The problems with the ob-
81 See Ball, supra note 4, at 655.
82 d.
8 See Oaks, supra note 74, at 739-42; Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and
Police Perury, 11 SAN Dmco L. REv. 839, 863-75 (1974).
84 This is not to suggest that it is impossible to demonstrate that a police
officer acted in bad faith. If, for example, it can be demonstrated by reference
to past police records that a particular officer often has his evidence suppressed,
the argument might be made that the officer pays little attention to the require-
ments of the fourth amendment, but instead simply "acts first" and tries to justify
his actions later if necessary. See infra text accompanying notes 248-50. In fact,
two commentators have argued that a close look at the record of the agent whose
conduct was reviewed in Williams reveals that he may not have acted in good
faith. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 417-23.
85 See supra notes 78-80.
80 622 F.2d at 841 n.4a.
B See infra text accompanying notes 103-12.
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jective facet of the Williams-type good faith test can be illustrated
by examining how the good faith exception was applied to the facts
of Williams itself.
In United States v. Williams,88 Jo Ann Williams had been
arrested for the second time by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
Special Agent Paul J. Markonni. Markonni had originally arrested
Williams for possession of heroin, but Williams was released pend-
ing appeal of the denial of a suppression motion.89 As a condition
of her release, she was required to remain in Ohio, pursuant to a
federal statute authorizing travel restrictions as part of bond con-
ditions.90 The second arrest, which was the subject of the Williams
court's inquiry, occurred when Agent Markonni subsequently saw
Williams in an Atlanta airport deboarding a flight from Los Angeles.
Aware of her travel restriction, Markonni arrested Williams for
violating her bond conditions. 91 In a search incident to the arrest,
Markonni found a packet of heroin in Williams' coat pocket, and a
later search of Williams' suitcases seized by Markonni revealed a
large quantity of heroin.
92
Williams moved to suppress the introduction of the heroin on
the ground that violating court-imposed bond conditions was not a
valid ground for arrest by a DEA agent, and that the search incident
to the arrest, and the later suitcase search, were tainted by the in-
valid arrest and were therefore unlawful.93 The magistrate who
originally heard Williams' suppression motion held that the arrest
was lawful, but the district court overruled the magistrate and sus-
tained Williams' suppression motion.94 A Fifth Circuit panel
agreed that the heroin should be suppressed, reasoning that only a
court had the authority to enforce its bond restrictions and that a
DEA agent acting on his own could not do so.95
The Fifth Circuit, on its own motion, directed an en banc
rehearing of the case.96 In one of two majority opinions, sixteen
of the twenty-four members of the en banc court held that the
88622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981).
89 See Williams, 622 F.2d at 833.
9o Id.
91 Id. 834.
92Id.
931d. 835.
94d.
95 United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979) (Goldberg &
Simpson, JJ.; Clark, J., dissenting), reh'g granted, 594 F.2d 98 (1979), rev'd,
622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
96 594 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1979).
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arrest was valid, and reversed the panel's granting of the suppres-
sion motion.97  In the critical second majority opinion, 13 of the
court's 24 members held that whether or not the arrest was lawful
need not be decided in order to determine whether to grant the
suppression motion 98-the heroin was admissible solely because the
arrest was made in the good faith and reasonable belief that such
an arrest was lawful.99
. The second majority found that Agent Markonni acted under
the belief that he had the authority to arrest Williams -because her
conduct violated her bond restriction. 100 After announcing and
supporting its two-pronged test for application of its newly fashioned
good faith exception,' 01 the court found that Markonni's actions
were taken in subjective good faith and were objectively reason-
able.10
2
' The only guidance the court gave for applying the critical
objective facet 103 of its test, however, was contained in a footnote.
The court stated that in order to be considered "reasonable," the
officer's belief must "be based on articulable premises sufficient to
cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to believe he was
acting lawfully." 104 The court failed, however, to articulate why
Markonni's belief-that violating a bond condition was a valid
ground for a DEA agent to effectuate an arrest-was a reasonable
belief. The only support given by the court for its determination
that Markonni's actions were reasonable was its comment that the
Fifth Circuit had not addressed the legal issue facing Markonni
when he made the arrest, but that the Fourth Circuit had "inferen-
tially" indicated that an arrest made by a law enforcement officer for
97622 F.2d at 833-39.
98622 F.2d at 840 (although many of the judges who join the good faitt
opinion agree with the other majority that the officer's conduct was constitutional,
it is "our view" that the evidence should not be suppressed "whether or not" the
officers actions were lawful; "good faith" analysis then undertaken without any
discussion of constitutional issue); see also id. 847 (Hill, J., concurring specially)
(supports approach of good faith majority, and emphasizes that the court should,
if possible, decline to reach and decide the constitutional issue if it can find the
evidence admissible on other grounds).
99622 F.2d at 840-47.
100 Id. 846.
1 '0 1 See supra text accompanying notes 78-86.
102 622 F.2d at 846, 847.
103 The objective facet of the Williams test is critical for the reasons dis-
cussed supra at text accompanying notes 80-86.
104 622 F.2d at 841 n.4a. Not only did the court confine its definition of
"reasonableness" to a short footnote, but it appears that even the footnote was
added as an afterthought-it is numbered.4a.
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violation of bond restrictions was valid.'1 5 Not only was the cited
opinion of questionable relevance, 106 but there was no indication
that Agent Markonni knew anything about the 1971 Fourth Circuit
opinion. In fact, there was no indication that Agent Markonni
could articulate any precedential support at all for his actions.1
0 7
In sum, the court held that Markonni's actions were "objectively"
reasonable simply because they looked reasonable. Right or wrong,
it can hardly be argued that the court applied any articulable,
objective standards in making its reasonableness determination.
Given these serious problems with the objective facet of the
Williams test, many of the criticisms of Williams outlined above 108
seem to follow. As demonstrated by examining the Williams
court's application of its own test to the facts of that case, the
critical "reasonableness" determination under the Williams test can
be made without elucidation as to what constitutes "reasonable"
police behavior. Whether a police officer's actions on the street
will later be considered "reasonable" is thus almost impossible for
the officer to predict. This consideration, combined with the fact
that under the Williams formulation it is unnecessary for a court
to determine, before beginning its good faith inquiry, whether the
conduct in question violated the fourth amendment's require-
ments,10 9 will mean that the continued development and articula-
tion of fourth amendment standards will be curtailed." 0 Such
fourth amendment standards as probable cause and consent to
search will be diluted into a vague and subjective "reasonableness"
requirement.:"'
105 See 622 F.2d at 846. The court referred to United States v. Avery,
447 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972).
106In Avery, the fourth circuit merely held that a defendant who had
travelled outside the area in which he was ordered to remain, pursuant to the
provisions of the Williams bond-condition statute, was properly adjudged guilty of
violating his bond terms despite his possession of a round-trip air ticket. There
is no indication that the defendant challenged his arrest on the ground that it
should have been executed by a court officer. In fact, there is no indication that
the arrest was challenged at all-it appears that the defendant merely challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence that led to his conviction. See id. 979. It is no
wonder that the Williams court characterized Avery as "inferentially" supporting
Agent Markonni's alleged basis for arrest, but even that characterization appears
to have been an exaggeration.
107 As Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 417-18, have pointed out,
Markonni was in fact unsure about the basis be had to arrest Williams.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
109 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
110This result is the one most feared by several good-faith-exception critics.
See authority cited supra note 29.
111 See authority cited supra note 31.
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Deterrence cannot work if the police do not know what they
are to be deterred from doing. 1 2 If the courts make no effort to
announce clear and objective fourth amendment standards, but
instead engage in the fuzzy and unpredictable "reasonableness"
inquiry which is at the heart of the Williams good faith exception,
then police officers will not be deterred effectively from violating
the Constitution in the future.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF DETERRENCE: A BETTER
BAsIs FOR THE FORMULATION OF A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
As argued in Part I, courts that have adopted the good faith
exception thus far have typically held a "narrow" view of deter-
rence." 3 They believe that suppression of unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence deters unconstitutional conduct primarily because
officers respond directly to suppression decisions, altering their
future behavior to prevent their evidence from being suppressed
again." 4 It is argued in this section that, contrary to the "narrow"
view of the good faith courts, suppression of evidence deters un-
constitutional conduct primarily by causing law enforcement policy
makers to respond to suppression decisions on an institutional level,
and that developing fourth amendment standards are filtered down
to police officers on a widespread basis through internal police
channels.'"
Because good faith courts have thus far improperly understood
how deterrence works, it is not surprising that they have formulated
a good faith exception that will significantly reduce the real deter-
rent effect of the exclusionary rule."16 More important, a proper,
institutionally based, understanding of how police officers are de-
terred from engaging in unconstitutional conduct suggests how a
new good faith exception can be developed that will avoid the pit-
falls of the current exception.
A. The Institutional View of Deterrence
Like proponents of the narrow view of deterrence, proponents
of the "institutional" or "systemic" view agree that the exclusionary
131 See id. Professor Oaks, supra note 74, at 731 has stressed that unclear
fourth amendment rules will make suppression an ineffective deterrent. He cites
the Bible at I Cor. 14:8: "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall
prepare himself to the battle?" Id. 731 n.194.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 74-77 & note 77.
"14 Id.
115 See infra text accompanying notes 117-41.
116 See infra text accompanying notes 142-46.
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rule deters unconstitutional conduct. 17 Unlike proponents of the
narrow view, however, proponents of the institutional view argue
that the exclusionary rule's primary effect is on the institutions that
shape police behavior," s and that exclusionary rule decisions are
aimed only incidentally at individual police officers. As Justice
Powell suggested when writing for the court in Stone v. Powell,"9
the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence not only has
the immediate effect of removing the police officer's incentive to
violate the fourth amendment, but "[m]ore importantly, over the
long term, [the demonstration provided by suppression] that our
society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional
rights is thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate
Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system." 120
Deterrence, according to the institutional view, occurs not be-
cause individual police officers read suppression decisions, 121 but
because police policy makers read them and fashion departmental
policies and regulations accordingly. Police training programs are
devised according to the policy maker's understanding of fourth
amendment decisions, and these programs, combined with other
internal guidelines, ultimately determine police conduct on the
street.' 22 As changes in fourth amendment law occur, they are
117 It should be noted that there is considerable debate about whether the
exclusionary rule deters unconstitutional police conduct at all, through any method.
Although limited empirical studies on the deterrent effect of the rule have been
made, the results are generally agreed to be inconclusive. For a flavor of the
debate surrounding whether the rule deters at all, compare Cannon, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: Have Critics Proven that it Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JuncAuanm
398 (1979) (empirical studies critical of the rule's deterrent effect are inconclusive,
but common sense indicates the rule has some deterrent effect) with Schlesinger,
The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven that it is a Deterrent to the
Police?, 62 Junic&TuBE 404 (1979) (advocates of the rule have failed to meet
their burden of proving that the rule works). While it is beyond the scope of
this Comment to undertake another empirical study on the effects of the present
exclusionary rule, it is argued infra at text accompanying notes 118-54 that the
rule has the potential, even if now untapped, to deter unconstitutional police
behavior, and that it will work even more effectively if its potential effect on the
police as an institutional body is properly understood and exploited.
118See, e.g., J. SxoLmcx, JusIcE Wrrour TRaL.L 219-20 (2d ed. 1975);
Amstersdam, supra note 22, at 430-32; Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger
Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1320, 1412-13
(1977); Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1050-55; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4,
at 399-401; Oaks, supra note 74, at 711-12, 756.
"9428 U.S. 465 (1976).
1201d. 492 (emphasis added).
121 Empirical studies suggest that a very low percentage of officers can be
expected to read or to learn about such decisions. See infra note 128, and ac-
companying text.
-122See infra text accompanying notes 134-41.
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gradually incorporated into the institutional guidelines that shape
police behavior.
As several commentators 123 and Justices 124 have argued, the
advantage to adopting an institutional view of deterrence is simple:
it most accurately describes how police conduct is influenced by the
exclusionary rule. The idea underlying the narrow view of deter-
rence-that court decisions directly affect police conduct-has been
seriously questioned by many commentators and jurists.'2 The
lines of communication between the prosecutor's office and indi-
vidual officers whose conduct is challenged are often quite poor.126
In addition, court decisions are often rendered years after the un-
constitutional conduct in question occurred.12 7  Further, studies
show that an extremely small percentage of police officers read
court decisions.128  Even -for the few officers who attempt to read
suppression decisions, it is unrealistic to expect them to keep abreast
of the latest legal intricacies of fourth amendment law as articulated
by courts all over the country.129 Fourth amendment decisions
tend to be quite complex, and most police officers will have diffi-
culty gleaning practical guidelines from them.130 Finally, perhaps
the most significant reason to question the idea underlying the nar-
row view of deterrence is that many police officers do not regard
"ivory tower" judges as legitimate and respected regulators of police
conduct.' 31 Thus, contrary to the narrow view that court decisions
directly affect police conduct, the institutional view recognizes that
police officers are more likely to respect and respond to administra-
tive norms developed by fellow law enforcement officials, 13 2 even if
1
2 3 See supra note 118.
124See, e.g., Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J.); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 557-58 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416-18
(1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Oaks, supra note 74, at 727-31; Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973).
126 See Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A Police
Officer's Perspective, 10 PAc. LJ. 33, 42 (1978). Oaks, supra note 74, at 730-31.
' 27See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 417 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128 See Hyman, supra note 126, at 42 (survey of local county police officers
indicated that only 3.3% of those questioned read court decisions, .006% read
United States Law Week, and .008% read law reviews); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at
417 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
12 9 See id.; Oaks, supra note 74, at 731.
130 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 417 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, supra
note 74, at 731; see also Amsterdam, suprq note 22, at 349.
lal See J. SEOLNIC, supra note 1i8, at 225-29.
132 See id. 219; see also Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1402-03. See generally
Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAw & CoN-
TEhM. PROBS, 500 (1971).
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those norms are contrary to court decisions. 133
Those who hold an institutional view of deterrence also point
out that police policy makers, including police administrators and
high-ranking officers, are in a much better position than rank-and-
file officers to develop and articulate fourth amendment standards.
Policy makers are more likely than street officers to pay close at-
tention to developing fourth amendment case law because they are
usually more concerned with successful prosecutions. 1' Also, police
administrators have an institutional duty to develop comprehensible
guidelines for search and seizure activity in that they are responsible
for officer training.1' Finally, police administrators can effectively
communicate fourth amendment standards through training mate-
rials and formal or informal regulations.'3 6 Rank-and-file officers
will be more likely to pay attention to such internal guidelines
than they would to guidelines contained in suppression decisions
not only because police policy makers are more respected by fellow
enforcement officers than the courts are,'3 7 but also because such
guidelines will undoubtedly be more understandable, realistic, and
practical than whatever guidelines are contained in suppression
decisions. 138
Although there is very little empirical "proof" that the exclu-
sionary rule in fact deters police conduct through the institutional
mechanisms described or through any other method,139 logic, expert
commentary, and concrete examples 140 suggest that if the exclu-
sionary rule deters at all, the institutional view of deterrence is far
more accurate than the "narrow" view in describing how that de-
terrence occurs. Hence if police policy makers can be encouraged
to be more aggressive in developing and implementing detailed
fourth amendment guidelines for the police to follow,'4 ' police
133 See Oaks, supra note 74, at 727.
134 See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 399.
135 See id. 399-400; Hyman, supra note 126, at 55-56; cf. Caplan, supra note
132, at 505.
136 See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 399.
137 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
138 See Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1403.
139 See supra note 117.
140 See generally sources cited supra note 118. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 4, at 399-401, point out that the District of Columbia Police Department
responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979), which outlawed random traffic stops, by promulgating departmental regu-
lations. This immediate and effective response to a suppression decision, they argue,
should significantly deter such unconstitutional behavior in the future. Id. 400-01;
see also infra note 229 and accompanying text.
141 At present, few police departments have undertaken the kind of adminis-
trative rulemaking efforts necessary to contribute significantly to deterrence. See
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conduct will be much more likely to conform to the requirements
of the fourth amendment.
Because the Williams-type good faith exception is based on a
narrow view of deterrence 142 that fails to understand how police
conduct is actually affected by the exclusionary rule,143 it is not
designed to encourage the development of internal police regula-
tions. In fact, because the Williams formulation permits the courts
to forgo determinations of whether constitutional violations oc-
curred,'4 and because the current good faith exception's critical
"reasonableness" test will produce only vague rationalizations for
the court's "objective" determinations, 145 it will be almost impos-
sible for even the most well-intentioned police policy makers to
glean practical fourth amendment standards from Williams-type
good faith decisions for their use in police regulation development.
To be sure, the Williams-type good faith exception will permit the
use of more probative evidence, but, contrary to the claims of its
supporters,'146 deterrence will be significantly reduced.
B. A Reformulated Good Faith Exception: Introduction
By fashioning a good faith exception based on an institutional
understanding of deterrence, a rule can be formulated that permits
the use of probative evidence in good faith situations without re-
ducing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. The new good
faith exception can be articulated simply: evidence should be ad-
mitted under a good faith exception only if it was obtained by an
officer who, even though later determined to have acted unconstitu-
tionally, acted pursuant to a specific institutional guideline that
reasonably reflected fourth amendment law as it existed at the time
of the officer's action.
The new good faith exception has the following advantages:
First, like the Williams exception, it will permit the use of more
probative evidence than the present exclusionary rule does. There
will be situations in which police officers complied with regulations
but still acted unconstitutionally. For example, because fourth
amendment law is quite complex and constantly changing,147 there
Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1404; Caplan, supra note 132, at 501-02; infra note 230
and accompanying text
142 See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 123-46.
1
4
4 See supra text accompanying note 98.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23, 68-73.
14 7 See supra note 22.
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.will be cases in which a regulation followed by. an officer, though
reflective of constitutional standards when followed, did not antici-
pate a new fourth amendment interpretation made by a court after
the actions occurred. In such situations the new good faith ex-
ception would permit the use of the evidence seized even though
the officer's actions are found by a reviewing court to have been un-
constitutional. Second, conviction-conscious police policy makers 148
will be given a strong new incentive to promulgate extensive search
and seizure regulations, because the new exception permits the use
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence only if it was seized pur-
suant to a specific institutional guideline.149 The promulgation of
regulations should result in more effective deterrence from uncon-
stitutional conduct, because street officers respond most effectively
to internal police regulations. 150 Third, police policy makers will
be provided with clearly articulated standards upon which to base
revisions of the regulations, because, as discussed in part IV,151 the
recommended formulation of the good faith exception requires
courts to determine, before beginning the regulation-conscious good
faith analysis, whether a constitutional violation occurred. Finally,
courts applying the good faith test can replace the fuzzy Williams-
type "objective" test 152 with a simple inquiry into whether the
officer's conduct was consistent with a police regulation.
It should be clear, however, that under the reformulated good
faith test, the courts must still make difficult "reasonableness" judg-
ments. The institutional guidelines upon which the officer relied
must reflect a reasonable, non-novel interpretation of fourth amend-
ment law as it existed at the time of the officer's actions. The
reasonableness of an officer's conduct can only reflect the reason-
ableness of the guidelines upon which he relied. As the institu-
tional perspective suggests, deterrence can only be achieved if the
entire law enforcement system is imbued with proper fourth amend-
ment values. 15 3 As discussed in more detail in part IV, 154 however,
the beauty of the reformulated good faith exception is that because
courts will be evaluating the reasonableness of amendable police
148 See supra text accompanying note 134.
149 See infra text accompanying notes 234, 243-46.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 131-38.
'6' See infra text accompanying notes 233, 233-38.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
153 Professor Amsterdam has suggested that the fourth amendment should be
viewed as creating a regulatory atmosphere under which the government as a whole
must function. See Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 367-72.
154 See infra text accompanying notes 233, 236-38, 260-64.
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regulations after deciding whether the officer's conduct was consti-
tutional, instead of evaluating the reasonableness of the officer's
past conduct without determining whether it was constitutional,
future deterrence through institutional reform is not threatened,
and fourth amendment law will continue to be developed.
III. POLICE RELIANCE UPON SUBSEQUENTLY INVALIDATED LEGAL
AUTHORITY: PRECEDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR A REFORMULATED
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court has supported the general principle that
evidence seized by an officer relying upon a subsequently invali-
dated legal rule should not always be suppressed.as Commentators
and good faith courts generally characterize such cases as "technical
violations," 58 and have included within this category of good faith
cases those in which an officer relied upon a "statute which is later
ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated, or a
court precedent which is later overruled." 's5 Such cases have been
distinguished from those involving "good faith mistakes," a category
including cases in which a police officer made a "judgmental error
concerning the existence of facts sufficient to constitute probable
cause," 158 consent to search, or the like. The proposed reformulated
good faith exception outlined in part II 59 and discussed in detail
below '-0 can be understood as requiring simply that the "reliance
requirement" underlying the "technical violations" cases should be
applied in the "good faith mistake" area as well.
This section examines cases that can be said to have involved
"technical violations." Although, it is demonstrated, the Supreme
Court has accepted the basic principle that when police officers rely
on subsequently invalidated guidelines the evidence should be ad-
mitted, some lower courts have improperly understood and applied
this principle in "technical violations" cases. Once again, it is
suggested that the courts' errors stem from their failure to adopt
an "institutional" perspective, which has caused the courts to fail
to extend their good faith and reasonableness inquiries beyond the
155 See infra text accompanying notes 162-72, 177-85.
156 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); Ball, supra note 4, at 635-36.
157 Ball, supra note 4, at 635-36. The Williams court also indicated that a
reasonable interpretation of a statute that is later construed differently should be
included under the "technical violations" facet of the exception. 622 F.2d at 843.
158 Ball, supra note 4, at 635; see Williams, 622 F.2d at 841.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 147-54.
160 See infra text accompanying notes 233-64.
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level of the police officer to the type and applicability of the guide-
line followed.
A. Reliance on Judicial Opinions Later Overruled
It is almost axiomatic that a police officer should be able to
rely on a controlling court decision to guide his actions. When
an officer can show that he relied directly on a policy announced
in a controlling and applicable court decision, then he has re-
sponded correctly to guidelines approved by the judiciary. In some
cases, however, the court decision relied upon by a police officer,
though valid when the officer acted, may be overruled subsequent
to his actions but before, or while, his conduct is reviewed. 161 The
reviewing court may believe that the decision relied upon by the
officer incorrectly interpreted a previously announced principle of
fourth amendment law, or the court may wish to announce a new
principle of constitutional law that expands individual rights. In
either case, neither the acting officer nor police policy makers can
be expected to anticipate that the decision relied upon will be
overruled. Rather, all elements of the police hierarchy have re-
sponded as well as they could to concrete (though later invalidated)
guidelines. Thus, application of the good faith exception to permit
use of the evidence seized seems appropriate.
The Supreme Court approved this general principle in United
States v. Peltier.16 -  Although, as Professor Edna Ball has pointed
out, Peltier was decided upon principles established in preceding
cases concerning the retroactive application of constitutional rul-
ings,163 "the bulk of the majority opinion is devoted to establishing
that the policies underlying the exclusionary rule do not require
retroactive application in cases where officials acted in good faith
reliance upon administrative regulations and judicial opinions." "
In Peltier, a border patrolman acting in the Ninth Circuit's
territory searched the defendant's car in a manner consistent with
police authority under a statute as interpreted by decisions in the
Fifth,165 Ninth,16 6 and Tenth Circuits, 167 and pursuant to longstand-
161 See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 162-72.
162422 U.S. 531 (1975).
' 63 See Ball, supra note 4, at 641 n.70.
164 Id.; see Peltier, 422 U.S. at 536-42.
165 See cases cited in Peltier, 422 U.S. at 541 n.9.
166 See cases cited in Peltier, 422 U.S. at 541 n.10.
167 See cases cited in Peltier, 422 U.S. at 541 n.11.
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ing administrative regulations.168  Soon after the search, the circuit
court precedents were overruled in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 19 in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a search
conducted even closer to the border than the Peltier search.'70  The
Peltier court held that Almeida-Sanchez should not be applied retro-
actively to cause suppression of the Peltier evidence, because the
officers involved had acted "in good-faith compliance with then-
prevailing constitutional norms," 171 and application of the exclu-
sionary rule would have no deterrent effect.'7 2
The Peltier-type situation, in which an officer bases his action
on a clearly applicable judicial precedent, should be distinguished
from cases in which an officer seeks to justify his actions based on a
novel interpretation of a court decision, without any judicial prece-
dent or administrative regulations to support it. Although fourth
amendment decisions are often open to interpretation,'73 the insti-
tutional view of deterrence suggests that police policy makers, and
not individual officers, should be the only law enforcement officials
to be rewarded for translating search and seizure decisions into
practical police guidelines.'74 If individual officers (or, more real-
istically, prosecutors handling their cases) are permitted to support
"good faith" claims with stretched interpretations of existing cases,
then the fourth amendment's requirements will most surely be
watered down. The Supreme Court, of course, has routinely re-%
jected attempts to justify unconstitutional police conduct with
stretched interpretations of existing precedents.' 5
'
0 8 See Peltier, 422 U.S. at 540. The regulations permitted roving border patrol
searches at any point within 100 miles of any external boundary of the United
States. Id. The Peltier search was conducted about 70 miles from the border.
Id. 533.
169 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Peltier search occurred four months before the
Court decided Almeida-Sanchez. See Peltier, 422 U.S. at 532.
17 0 See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
'.7lPeltier, 422 U.S. at 536.
172 Id. 542.
'73 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 757 (1979) ("law enforcement
officials often find it difficult to discern the proper application of . . .principles to
individual cases ....").
' 74 This is not to suggest that police policy makers should be permitted to
interpret court decisions as they please; their interpretations must be scrutinized by
the courts for their reasonableness. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54 and
infra text accompanying notes 251-64.
'75See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), overruled, United
States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). In Robbins, the officer attempted to justify,
his warrantless search of two opaquely wrapped packages found in the trunk of an
automobile by advocating an expansive interpretation of the automobile warrant
exception announced in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). But the Court
rejected the officer's interpretation and held that the search was unconstitutional
under the rule of Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753 (1979), that closed containers
1982] - -
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B. Reliance on Statutes Later Invalidated
An important part of the police's duty is to enforce statutory
law. An officer who performed precisely as commanded by a statute
necessarily made a good faith effort to act properly. The Supreme
Court has lent support to the general principle that evidence seized
pursuant to a statute should not be suppressed even if the statute
is later ruled to be unconstitutional.17 6
In Michigan v. DeFillippo,177 the Michigan Court of Appeals
had held that a Detroit ordinance, which permitted police officers
to stop and question an individual upon reasonable cause to believe
the individual's behavior "warrants further investigation for crimi-
nal activity," and which also declared it unlawful for a person so
stopped not to identify himself,178 was unconstitutionally vague. 179
The United States Supreme Court held, however, that despite the
statute's unconstitutionality, evidence seized pursuant to a then-
lawful arrest under the statute (for failure to produce identification)
should not be suppressed,8 0 noting that "[t]o deter police from en-
forcing a presumptively valid statute was never remotely in the con-
templation of even the most zealous advocate of the exclusionary
rule." 181
The Court somewhat confusingly distinguished the Detroit
ordinance from statutes which, "by their own terms, authorized
searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the traditional
warrant and probable-cause requirements .... 1 812 In cases involv-
ing statutes of the latter type the Court had held that suppression
found within vehicles cannot be searched without a warrant unless there are exigent
circumstances. Interestingly, in United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), the
post-O'Connor Court ultimately vindicated the Robbins officer's interpretation, al-
though it obviously could not "un-suppress" the Robbins evidence, by overruling
Robbins and holding that even closed containers within automobiles could be
searched under the automobile warrant exception.
176 See infra text accompanying notes 177-85.
177443 U.S. 31 (1979).
178 Id. 33 n.1.
179 See id. 34.
180 See id. 40.
181 Id. 38 n.3.
182 Id. 39. The Court seemed to draw a distinction between substantive laws
that define criminal offenses-such as the Detroit ordinance that made failure to
produce identification if stopped a criminal offense-and procedural statutes that
improperly define circumstances in which warrantless searches are permitted. Evi-
dence seized during searches conducted pursuant to the former type of statute is
not to be suppressed even if the statute is later held to be unconstitutional, whereas
evidence seized pursuant to the second type of statute is to be suppressed. As one,
commentator has noted, however, the basis for this distinction is not clear. See
Washington Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 865-66.
[Vol.130:1610
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
was required even though the evidence had been obtained pursuant
to the statute. s3  It appears, then, that DeFillippo suggests that
officers who act pursuant to statutes valid at the time the actions
took place have acted in good faith, and that the evidence seized
pursuant to such statutes should not be suppressed unless later
analysis reveals that the statute is "flagrantly unconstitutional" or
"by [its] own terms" authorizes searches without probable cause.'1s
It should be clear that just as Peltier does not authorize the
admission of evidence seized pursuant to an unsupported interpre-
tation of judicial precedent,8s- DeFillippo does not authorize ad-
mission of evidence seized pursuant to a novel statutory interpreta-
don-evidence is admissible only if its seizure was justified by a
direct and unambiguous statutory provision 's8 or a statutory inter-
pretation supported by clear judicial precedent."8 7 One justification
for the holding in United States v. Williams was that the officer's
actions were based on a reasonable interpretation of a statute estab-
lishing bond conditions. 88 However, the officer in Williams could
not point to an unambiguous judicial decision or even an applicable
administrative regulation to support his construction of the stat-
ute.18 9 Contrary to the court's assertion, therefore, neither Peltier
nor DiFillippo supports the "technical violation" facet of the court's
good faith holding.!99
C. Reliance on Warrants Later Invalidated
The requirement of a warrant signed by a magistrate and based
on probable cause as a precondition to most searches and arrests is
1
8 3 See DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38.
184 Id. 38-39. It might be argued that DeFillippo extends a limited "good
faith" test to legislatures, by permitting the use of evidence seized under a statute
as long as it is not "flagrantly" or "by (its] own terms" violative of the fourth
amendment requirements.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
186 In DeFillippo, there was no question that the defendant had not produced
identification as specifically required by the Detroit ordinance, and so the search
and seizure that followed was clearly authorized by the statute. See DeFillippo,
443 U.S. at 34.
187 In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), the border patrolman's
interpretation that the statute involved permitted border searches within 70 miles
of the border was supported by several clear judicial precedents, see id. 540-41.
18 8 See United States v. Williams, 622 U.S. 830, 843, 846 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
18 See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
10 See Williams, 622 F.2d at 843; see supra text accompanying notes 162-75,
177-85.
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a fundamental fourth amendment requirement.191 Although the
Supreme Court has carved out substantial and important exceptions
to the warrant requirement, 192 warrants still form an integral part
of the fourth amendment regulatory system, and police officers are
encouraged to secure them in all doubtful situations.193 Any good
faith exception should not alter the warrant requirement, and the
Williams court, in what has been described as a moment of "un-
characteristic self-restraint," '194 made it clear that its good faith ex-
ception does not apply to factual situations in which a warrant was
obtained.195 Several commentators have suggested, however, that
the logic behind the good faith "technical violations" branch can
be extended to warrant cases 196-when an officer relied on a warrant
later invalidated, he responded correctly to institutional guidelines,
so the evidence he seized should be admitted.
Careful analysis, however, reveals that because of the unique
position of the warrant in the fourth amendment regulatory system,
a proper good faith exception should have only limited application
in this area. There is no question that a police officer who ob-
tained a presumptively valid warrant and acted pursuant to its
authority has performed his duty in subjective good faith. But
even the Williams court recognized that an officer's good faith is
not enough-his actions must also be reasonable. 197 The question,
then, is whether police actions taken pursuant to a warrant should
automatically be deemed reasonable, as actions taken pursuant to
DeFillippo-type statutes .98 and clear court precedents '19 have been,
or whether the reasonableness of his actions is completely de-
pendent upon the "reasonableness" of the warrant.
The correct answer is the latter-an officer's actions can only
be deemed "reasonable" if the warrant he relied upon is reasonable,
The very purpose of the warrant requirement is to inject a detached
judicial determination of whether the required elements for a search
191 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (the reasons for the prefer-
ence for searches conducted pursuant to warrants "go to the foundations of the
Fourth Amendment").
192 For a brief summary of the warrant exceptions, see United States v. Ven-
tresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 n.2 (1965); J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRnINAL PROCEDURE
IN A NUTSHELL 132-56 (3d ed. 1980).
193 See Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 106.
194 Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 427.
195 See Williams, 622 F.2d at 840 n.1.
196 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 4, at 635-36, 641; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 4, at 427.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80, 85-86.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 177-87.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 162-72.
[Vol. 130:1610
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
or arrest exist in a particular case.200  If magistrates are permitted
to issue "unreasonable" warrants, which authorize searches without
probable cause, then the warrant has not served its constitutionally
mandated function.201 Without the requirement that magistrates
issue constitutionally valid warrants, magistrates disposed to au-
thorize "broadcast break-ins" would go unchecked.
The more difficult question is how "reasonable" a magistrate's
determinations must be. Should searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant that reflects a "good faith and reasonable," but incorrect,
interpretation by the magistrate of the required elements of prob-
able cause be upheld? A proper understanding of the unique place
of the warrant within the law enforcement system compels a nega-
tive answer. Because warrants are issued by detached magistrates
and are relevant only to the specific facts of a particular case, there
is no institutional reason to permit them to be anything less than
completely correct constitutionally. Detached magistrates, unlike
police officers acting under competitive and trying circumstances,
should be required to be more than reasonably correct-they should
be required to be correct, just like any other judge whose decision
is reviewed. This is not harsh, for under present law a magistrate's
determination is already considered constitutionally correct if it is
reasonable. The tests for probable cause that presently exist permit
the magistrate to exercise some discretion in applying them to fact-
specific situations, and require that he exercise no more than com-
mon sense and reasonableness in his judgments.20 2  To add another
level of "good faith and reasonableness" scrutiny hence seems un-
necessary.
Another reason warrants should be judged, under a different
standard than, for example, police regulations is that it is much
easier to determine if probable cause exists under a particular set
of facts than it is to formulate a regulation which ,will ensure that
officers acting in a variety of situations will have acted with prob-
able cause. In addition, regulations can be revised if found to be
reasonable but not absolutely correct, whereas a warrant that has
authorized a search without probable cause, because it is designed
2 00 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). -
201 The fourth amendment explicitly requires that "no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause....." U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
202 See Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108-09 (affidavits supporting search warrants
should be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion, and resolution of
doubtful cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded, to
warrants issued by magistrates); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)
(the existence of probable cause turns on the "factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.").
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to apply in only one particular situation, has completely failed in
its one-time function. Permitting some leeway in scrutiny of police
regulations is justified on the ground that such leeway will at least
encourage their promulgation,2 3 which will have long-term deter-
rent benefits,2 0 4 whereas permitting even slightly constitutionally
defective warrants can have no long-term deterrent benefit, but will
only result in the dilution of the probable cause requirement.
The good faith exception, however, can be applied to scrutiny
of warrants for statutory requirements that have nothing to do with
probable cause. Such requirements are usually procedural in
nature,205 and can be accurately deemed "technical." When a
magistrate fails to meet a statutory requirement, he usually has not
committed a judgment error that affects the suspect's constitutional
rights, but has committed an inadvertent procedural error. For
example, a New York court correctly upheld a warrant when a
magistrate heard all of the information necessary to sustain an im-
mediate nighttime search, but inadvertently failed to include in the
warrant a sentence specifically authorizing such a search, as required
by a New York statute.20 6  Similarly, the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals correctly applied the good faith exception to admit evidence
seized pursuant to a warrant mistakenly issued beyond the magis-
trate's territorial jurisdiction.20 7 In both cases, the suspect's consti-
tutional rights were not affected by the defective warrants, and it
appears that there would be no deterrence served by application of
the exclusionary rule to such inadvertent errors.
D. Reliance on Administrative Rules
Application of the good faith exception is also appropriate
when a police officer has acted in reliance on clearly delineated
administrative regulations. 208 Rules that delineate a code of conduct
for police should be encouraged, because they most effectively deter
unconstitutional conduct 209 and provide natural, objective criteria
by which courts can evaluate a police officer's good faith. In
203 See infra text accompanying notes 252-55.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 139-41; infra text accompanying note
264.
205 See, e.g., cases discussed infra notes 206-07.
206 See People v. Arnow, 108 Misc. 2d 128, 436 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Sup. Ct
1981).
207 See Richmond v. Commonwealth, No. 80-1366 (Ky. Ct. App. July 31,
1981) (capsulized in 50 U.S.L.W. 2162 (Sept. 22, 1981)).
2 08 See infra text accompanying notes 243-47.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 118-41.
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Peltier21 ° and at least, one other case,2' 1 .police reliance on .Iong-
standing administrative regulations, though subsequently held to be
constitutionally defective, weighed heavily against exclisi6on of the
evidence seized.
As discussed briefly earlier,212 and developed -dater.a21 however,
a sensible good faith analysis must extend not only to. the reason-
ableness of an officer's reliance on specific regulations; ..but also to
ithe reasonableness of .the regulations themselves. : The. good.: faith
court must inquire whether the regulations relied upon were reason-
able in light. of fourth amendment law as it existed at the time of
the. seizure.
.:In State v. Mincey2 14 the Arizona Supreme Court recently went
halfway toward. adopting a sensible good, faith exception by recog-
nizing the propriety of applying the exception to .a situation in
which an officer relied on well-defined police procedures even
though his actions ultimately were unconstitutional. The court
reached the wrong result, however, because it failed- to extend,
as suggested by an institutional view of deterrence, the good "faith
inquiry beyond the principal officer involved.
In Mincey, a homicide detective acting in accordance with a
specific police policy sought legal advice on the necessity of-obtain-
ing a search warrant.215 . The officer was told by the county attorney,
incorrectly, that he did not-need a warrant to conduct the-search
contemplated.2 16 Because the officer had acted in good faith reliance
on the sought-after information, the court admitted the wrongfully
seized evidence.
2 1 7
The Mincey court reached the wrong result because.it failed
to realize the importance of scrutinizing the county attorney's
actions. His actions should have been examined because of their
profound institutional effect on the officer's behavior and the, be-
havior of future officers acting pursuant to -the regulation requiring
that his advice be sought. In Mincey, the county attorney's advice
210 422 U.S. at 541 (reliance upon statute as interpreted by longstanding
administrative regulations that had been approved by the judiciary weighs against
exclusion of evidence).
211 See United States v. The Recorder, 27 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849)
(No. 16,130) (seizure of ship pursuant to interpretation of niavTigation act *adopted
by Secretary of Treasury upheld even though construction later proved erroneous).
212 See supra- text accompanying notes 153-54.
2 13 See infra text accompanying notes 251-64.
214 130 Ariz.,389, 636 P.2d 637 (1981), ceit. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1638(1982).
215 See Mincey, i30 Ariz at 402, 636 P.2d at,650.
216 See id.
217 See id.
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was not only clearly wrong under current fourth amendment law,
but the attorney testified that he knew he was giving incorrect
advice.218 The attorney's bad faith should have been imputed to
the officer, and the evidence should have been excluded. Exclusion
in Mincey would deter the attorney from giving knowingly and
clearly incorrect advice in the future, which would in turn prevent
unconstitutional action by police officers seeking his advice.
In sum, there is ample support for the proposition that the
exclusionary rule should not be applied when police officers have
acted pursuant to certain types of recognized legal authority that is
later declared invalid. The most difficult determination is whether
the type of legal authority relied upon-a court opinion, statute,
warrant, or administrative regulation-is the type that requires an
extension of the good faith inquiry to scrutiny of the "reasonable-
ness" of the authority relied upon, and if so, the level of scrutiny
to be applied. It has been argued that the "reasonableness" of
administrative regulations must be scrutinized, 219 and in part IV,
which discusses in detail the regulation-conscious good faith excep-
tion proposed above,220 it is suggested that police regulations must
be scrutinized for their reflection of existing fourth amendment
values and their reasonableness as enlightened by a proper under-
standing of the importance of such regulations to effective deter-
rence of unconstitutional police conduct.
2 21
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A RiEFORMULATED GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
A. Introduction
Although the reliance principle discussed in part III 222 has
been applied to justify the use of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence in "technical violation" cases, 223 the current good faith ex-
ception does not require the principle to be applied in "good faith
mistake" cases involving on-the-street judgment errors by police
officers.224 Such errors,22 5 often the result of split-second decisions,228
218 See id.
2 19 See supra text accompanying notes 153-54, 212-13.
2 2 0 See supra text accompanying notes 147-54.
221 See infra text accompanying notes 251-64.
2 2 2 See supra text accompanying notes 155-219.
223 E.g., situations in which the court precedent, statute, warrant, or admin-
istrative rule relied on by an officer is invalidated after the actions in question
occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 161-219.
224 See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 844-46 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
225 E.g., mistakes regarding the existence of facts sufficient to establish probable
cause necessary to conduct a warrantless search; the validity of a consent to search;
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are at issue in many fourth amendment exclusionary rule cases.
Thus, unless officers are comprehensively trained in how to respond
consistently with the fourth amendment when confronted with on-
the-street situations, the institutional view of deterrence suggests
that the likelihood of unconstitutional police conduct is high.227
It is therefore not surprising that the concept of police rulemaking
and training in the fourth amendment context has received strong
support. 22
8
Unfortunately, studies suggest that although some police de-
partments have made an effort to develop search and seizure guide-
lines, 229 such efforts are not widespread. Even when such efforts are
undertaken, they usually produce only token training programs, and
regulations that are far from comprehensive.23 0  Unless police de-
the existence of exigent circumstances; and the reasonable suspicion necessary to
justify a stop-and-frisk.
226 It is because such decisions involve a good possibility of being incorrect that
the preference for warrants issued by detached magistrates has been created. See
supra text accompanying notes 193, 200.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 118-41.
228 See, e.g., K. DAvis, DxscRsnoNARv JusTIcE 80-96 (1969); Amsterdam,
supra note 22, at 416-34; Caplan, supra note 132, at 500-14; Hyman, supra note
126, at 55-61; Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1050-55; McGowan, Rule-Making and the
Police, 70 MicH. L. REv. 659 (1972); Quinn, The Effect of Police Rulemaking on
the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 52 U. DET. J. UnB. L. 25 (1974) (also
points out that that concept of police rulemaking has been approved by the ABA and
ALT, see STAinmDmS RErATING TO =H UnBAN POUCE FUNCTION 116-44 (Approved
Draft 1973) and MoDEL CODE OF PRE-ARAicNMENT PROCEDURE § 10.3 (Official
Draft No. 1, 1972)).
229 Although there is no available empirical study scrutinizing recent police
department efforts at ruemaking, several older studies suggest that some depart-
ments have either experimented with or instituted departmental rules in the search
and seizure area. Quinn, supra note 228, at 26 n.9, has documented rulemaking
efforts by the Chicago, Columbus, New York City, District of Columbia, Los Angeles,
Memphis, and San Antonio Police Departments. Caplan, supra note 132, at 502
nn.5-6, has also documented the District of Columbia Police Department's actual
promulgation of specific orders governing eyewitness identification of suspects and
automobile searches, and Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 399-401, have
documented the District of Columbia's recent rulemaking efforts regarding random
traffic stops, and also the institutional responses of border-patrol-agent policy makers,
id. 400 n.174, and federal law enforcement officials, id. 401 n.175, to fourth amend-
ment decisions. Finally, the development of the "drug courier profile" by the Drug
Enforcement Administration, see United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.
1977), indicates that police agencies can develop practical guidelines to aid in the
search and seizure area, although the Supreme Court has held that the "drug courier
profile" needs refinement before satisfaction of its criteria can alone be considered
to establish probable cause necessary to conduct a warrantless search, see Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980). The Supreme Court will soon take another look at
the drug courier profile in State v. Royer, 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1079 (1981) (No. 80-2146). The -Court could
conceivably give a boost to the concept of police rulemaking in the fourth amend-
ment area by legitimizing the profile or using it as the basis for the application of
a reformulated good faith exception.
230 See Caplan, supra note 132, at 501-02; Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1404
(both indicate that few police departments have developed more than minimum
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partments are given stronger incentives to develop meaningful
search and seizure regulations and training programs, unconstitu-
tional conduct will continue undeterred.
2 3 1
The necessary incentive can be created by developing a new
good faith exception that extends the "reliance requirement" to
the good faith mistake area.2 32  This can be done by permitting
the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence on the condition
that the acting officer relied on a specific administrative regulation.
Once such regulations are in place, courts will be better able to
evaluate whether police officers acted in accordance with the specific
requirements of the fourth amendment, because printed search and
seizure regulations will provide an objective link between on-the-
street police behavior and courtroom review.
B. The Anatomy of the Reformulated Good Faith Exception:
A Skeletal Sketch
The proposed regulation-conscious good faith exception must
be structured so that it can be easily administered by the courts
and so that its application will permit greater use of probative
evidence without reducing the deterrent effect of the current ex-
clusionary rule. It is helpful to understand the context into which
each step of the proposed good faith inquiry fits before analyzing
each step in detail; therefore, in this subsection, the skeletal
anatomy of the proposed new exception will be presented, and in
the next subsection its parts will be examined.
A court desiring to apply the proposed good faith exception
must engage in what is essentially a three-part inquiry, with the
second part consisting of two important subparts. Each step in-
volves finding the answer to a "yes or no" question. Whether it is
necessary to the suppression decision to go on to the next step de-
pends solely upon the answer to each of those questions. The sepa-
rate inquiries engaged in must be conducted only in the order
stipulated.
written rules of conduct, with the exceptions noted supra note 229). Studies have
commonly called for increased police training. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADvIsORY
COMMITTE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 392 (1973).
A 1967 study showed that the average police officer received less than 200 hours
of formal training, as compared with more than 9000 hours for lawyers, 5000 hours
for embalmers, and 4000 hours for barbers. See id. 380.
231 See Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1404 ("[a]bsent external prodding, it is
unlikely that many [departments] will [engage in rulemaking]").
232 See supra text accompanying notes 147-54; infra text accompanying notes
243-64.
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First, the court must ask whether the officer's. conduct was un-
constitutional. This is the traditional fourth amendment. inquiry;
it must be conducted without regard to the officer's subjective or
objective good faith. The court must simply decide if the officer's
conduct was consistent with the strict requirements of the fourth
amendment and must forgo all balancing that would be appropriate
if it were trying to decide whether to .apply the judicially created
suppression remedy.
233
During this part of its inquiry the court .should feel free-to
apply current fourth amendment doctrine as strictly required by
the Constitution. If the court determines, that the police officer's
conduct was completely consistent with the fourth amendment, then
the evidence seized should not be suppressed and the case has been
fully decided. If, however, the court determines that the officer's
conduct was unconstitutional, then it may proceed to determine
whether the suppression remedy is appropriate according to the
new good faith inquiry.
Second, the court must determine whether the evidence-seizing
officer acted in reliance upon a reasonably specific and applicable
institutional guideline. 234  If the answer is negative, then the evi-
dence must be suppressed regardless of any mitigating circumstances,
and the case has been fully decided. If the'aiswer is positive, then
it is necessary to proceed to step three. The second and third steps
are only necessary if the prosecution wishes to press the "good faith"
defense. The burden of proving the elements necessary to pass the
tests in the last two steps is on the prosecution.
In engaging in the regulation-conscious second inquiry, the
court must confront two separate issues. First, it must determine if
the regulation allegedly relied upon was specific enough to dictate
the appropriate response to the situation the officei faced. If the
regulation was not specific enough, then the second inquiry. ends
and the evidence seized must be suppressed. Second, the court
must determine if the acting officer in fact relied 'upon the regula-
tion he or she claims to have relied upon. In mogt cases, it will be
difficult to refute testimony that the Officer acted in (subjectiVe) god
faith reliance upon the regulation presented to the court.235 Biff
233 It is critical that the constitutional inquiry, be conducted first. See infra
text accompanying notes 236-38.
23 4
1n this section of the Comment, 'the focus is on police reliance.on depart-
mental regulations. However, as discussed supra at' text 'accompanying'notes 155-84,
the police officer may also validate his search-by demonstrating that he relied on
a controlling court precedent or on a DeFillippo-type statute.
235 See supra text accompanying notes .81-83.
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there is sufficient evidence of bad faith then the evidence seized
must be suppressed even if the officer's conduct conformed with the
regulation presented. If the court determines, however, that the
regulation was specific enough to dictate the appropriate response
and was in fact relied upon, then it must proceed to the third part
of its good faith inquiry.
Third, the court must ask whether the institutional guideline
relied upon was a reasonably accurate reflection of fourth amend-
ment law as it existed at the time the evidence was seized. If the
answer is negative, then the evidence must be suppressed because
the unreasonableness of the regulation must be imputed to the
officer's conduct. If the answer is positive, then the evidence seized
may be admitted at trial under the new good faith exception.
As good faith- cases applying the recommended analysis pro-
liferate, regulations that were deemed reasonable in an early case
will not be deemed reasonable again if they are not revised to pre-
vent the reoccurrence of the type of unconstitutional conduct they
permitted in the first case.
C. Analysis of the Reformulated Good Faith Exception
The regulation-conscious good faith exception sketched above
is structured to permit the maximum use of probative evidence
with the minimum reduction in the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule. In this section, the rationale for the new exception's
structure is presented, and some of the problems that will be faced
in administering the test will be discussed.
Perhaps the most critical feature of the recommended good
faith exception is the requirement that the court decide, before
beginning the good faith inquiry, whether the officer's conduct in
question was constitutional. If police policy makers are to develop
and continually revise fourth amendment regulations, it is essential
that they be able to ascertain what conduct has been determined
to be unconstitutional. Otherwise, as Justice Brennan has argued,
fourth amendment law will "stop dead in its tracks" as suppression
cases are decided solely on the basis of whether police conduct was
reasonable and in good faith, and without the articulation of clear
and sometimes new fourth amendment standards.2 36  Because the
new good faith exception requires courts to decide the constitutional
issues first and to articulate the reasons for their constitutional hold-
236 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see supra text accompanying notes 29-33; 108-12.
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ings, future police policy makers will know where the continually
developing contours of the fourth amendment lie.
The requirement that a constitutional determination be articu-
lated may have a further salutary effect. It has been argued that
courts suspecting that evidence might be admitted under a good
faith exception even if they find the police to have engaged in un-
constitutional conduct will feel freer to interpret the fourth amend-
ment honestly and more liberally, because they will not be in-
fluenced in their constitutional reasoning by the realization that a
strict interpretation might cause the release of dangerous crimi-
nals.23 7 If this is the case, it is essential to structure the good faith
exception so that the courts have a chance to exercise their hereto-
fore confined ability to interpret the fourth amendment accu-
rately 2
38
Once a constitutional violation is held to have occurred, the
burden of establishing the good faith defense should be on the
prosecution.2 39  This should prevent criminal defendants from
being overly discouraged from attempting to establish a fourth
amendment violation.2 40 Defendants should realize that, especially
2 3 7 See Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to
Preserve a Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DEPAuL L. REv.
51 (1980); Skolnick, supra note 17.
238 It might be argued that the requirement that a good faith court decide the
constitutional issue before confronting the good faith question will require the courts
to engage in the disfavored practice of rendering advisory opinions on constitutional
issues. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 450. The Supreme Court,
however, has held that for purposes of deciding suppression motions, the "focus on
intent... becomes relevant only after it has been determined that the Constitution
was in fact violated." Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 n.13 (1978)
(emphasis added); see also Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1420. As Judge Rubin
suggested in his dissent in Williams, it is unnecessary and unwise to embark on a
good faith inquiry unless the defendant has prevailed first in. his contention that the
police's conduct was unconstitutional. See Williams, 622 F.2d at 848 (Rubin, J.,
dissenting).
As a practical matter, it is impossible for a.court to determine if police conduct
or a governing police regulation is "reasonably" close to the applicable constitutional
standard unless the court first determines what that standard is. Further, as one
good faith court noted, "jurisprudential considerations require that the court decide
whether or not the actions of the officers [were] indeed lawful .... Not to do so
would undercut the responsible obligation of the Courts to articulate the contburs
of responsible conduct." - United States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386, 398 n.16 (W.D.
Pa. 1981). Finally, because the exclusionary rule is properly viewed as a judicially
created remedy, see cases cited supra note 18, and because consideration of remedies
is inappropriate until the determination has been made that a right has been
infringed, inquiry into whether there has been a fourth amendment violation should
precede the determination of whether the remedy of suppression is appropriate or
whether a good faith defense makes it inappropriate. --
7239 See supra text following note 234.
24oMertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 451-53, have argued that the
present good faith exception will reduce the defendant's incentive to file suppression
motions.
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during, the early- stages -of the new exception, the prosecution may
have difficulty meeting -its burden because police departments will
not yet- have promulgated regulations comprehensive and specific
.enough to meet the first part -of the second test described above. 241
Further, as one proponent-of police regulations' has pointed out,
242
putting the burden on the prosecution to establish that applicable
regulations have been -promulgated will force the prosecution to
present printed regulations. to the court, which will relieve the de-
fendant from being forced to discover police records, ensure that
suppression- decisions -are based on tangible evidence, and simplify
appellate -review.. Finally; because -all cases in -which, the good faith
inquiry-is reached will, under -the -proposal, necessarily involve un-
constitutional police conduct, it is appropriate that the burden to
prove the existence of applicable regulations, the reasonableness of
those regulations, and the subjective good faith of the officer in-
volved, should fall upon the prosecution, which seeks to avoid the
harsh consequences of the. exclusionary rule. .
. As proposed -above,243 once -it has been established that the
police engaged in unconstitutional conduct, the court should begin
its good faith inquiry by determining whether the officer involved
followed.specific and.applicable police regulations. The applicable
regulations must be presented in printed form to the court so that
it can. detenine if. theyare specific enough to have dictated the
.officer's response in the situation in which he or she acted. This
.requirement will encourage'the police to develop clear and specific
'regulations covering as comprehensively as possible the variety of
situations With. which- officers in the department are likely to be
confronted.
- -Thus, regulations should be -tailored to the particular tour of
duty of the various classes of officers within a department. There
should -be -for -example, -separate sets- of regulations for narcotics
officers, highway patrolmen, border patrolmen, street officers, under-
cover agents, and vice-squad members. Regulations should reflect
.the varying problems likely io. be encountered in day versus night
duty, high-crime versus -low-crime areas, commercial versus resi-
dential versus indtistrial areas, airports, and so on. Standards should
be developed to guide officers trying to determine if probable cause,
reas6nable suspicion, ekigent circumstances, or consent to search is
present. In sum, the regulations should be drawn to combine the
2 . 41 See supra text accompanying note.234; infra text accompanying notes 243-46.
2 42 See Kaplan, supra note.33,,at 1051-52.
243 See supra text following note 234.
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practical experience of he police with. appropriate constitutional
standards.244  Under the good faith test advocated,. the-morespecific
the regulation, the more likely the evidence.will -be 'admitted-and,
incidentally but importantly, the closer police behavior, should be-
come to constitutional conduct.
I Courts trying to determine if police: regulations. aie specific
enough to have dictated an officer's behavior must be- sensitive.;to
the fact that 'it is impossible to develop regulations covering every
possible fact-specific situation, and. that. even. if it .were possible. to
do so, the regulations would be so voluminous -.that individual
officers could not possibly absorb them.2 45 . Hence. the court should
not require the regulation allegedly followed to be pefectly tailored
to the precise fact situation the officer-confronted, but.only that the
regulation announce a fairly specific practical.guide which in fact
offered guidance to the officer involved. :As regulations .are refined
over time, the proper balance between broadness and specificity
will be struck because police departments will be fQrced..to amend
overbroad regulations, which permitted unconstitutional behavior,
in order to have the regulation declared 'reasonable" again in.the
future.240 -In any event, the existence of printed -regulations will
make it much- easier for courts to .determine objectively whether
police officers acted reasonably and in good faith..
If a court determines that the regulations. allegedly followed
were not specific enough to dictate the.. officer's behavior, then the
unconstitutionally seized -evidence must be suppressed. 24 7  Con-
versely, if the court determines that the. regulation was adequate,
it must embark on the second prong of the two:part test: it must
determine whether the officer was in fact influenced by the regula-
tion presented to the court and whether .there is any evidence of
subjective bad faith. It will usually be difficult for -the prosecu-
tion to fail this test, because in most cases. the officer's testimony,
that he relied upon the specific guideline being presented to the
244 Specific examples of hypothetical i5ohrc6-made fule appbar in Hymaii, supra
note i26, at 58-61; Quinn, supra note 228, at 4454' These example& indicate that
the practical experience of police officials, and constitutional standards. can be com-
bined to form useful regulations.
245 See Schroeder, supra note 1, at 1406; Quinn, supra note 228, -at 33.
246 See supra text following note'234;' ifra text accompanying notes 256. 259.
261-64.
247 Of course, the officer may still attempt to show that he relied upon a valid
legal authority other than a police regulation; such as 'a clear and applicable court
decision or a DeFillippo-type statute. It is expected, loweverf that ag police fegt
lations become more comprehensive, they will almost completely replace -stich
authority as guides to police action.
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court, will be difficult to- refute.248 But facts may come to light
that suggest that such testimony is false.249 For example, a defense
attorney may bring out on cross-examination that the officer in-
volved does not have a reasonable grasp of departmental regula-
tions. Or, the defense attorney may demonstrate that the officer
involved has a record of constitutional violations, thus suggesting
that the officer feels insufficiently constrained by constitutional re-
quirements. °50 Because the burden falls on the prosecution to
establish that the officer who acted unconstitutionally did so despite
a good faith effort to follow a police regulation, courts should view
the absence of police records on individual officer's constitutional
violations as evidence of bad faith. If the prosecution cannot
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer in-
volved fully intended to comply with an applicable institutional
guideline, then the evidence should be suppressed.
Some may question the need for a "subjective" facet of the new
good faith test, arguing that because the subjective intent of an
officer has no bearing on whether evidence is admitted when a court
determines that the officer acted constitutionally, it should have no
bearing on the application of a good faith exception if he acted in
full, though unintentional, compliance with police regulations.
However, without the subjective facet of the test, there will be less
incentive for critical police training programs. Prosecutors would
simply be able to assess the police conduct involved and pick a
regulation, after the fact, to justify the conduct. There would be
no need for the officer involved to take the witness stand, and
whether the officer involved even knew of the regulation would
become inconsequential. Also, because a "good faith" officer's
actions are already tainted by their unconstitutionality, and the
determination being made is whether to apply an exception to the
general rule that evidence seized by such conduct must be sup-
pressed, it is not unreasonable to exclude the class of cases that are
further tainted by the officer's subjective bad faith.
As proposed above,25 a court that determines that the officer
in question did act pursuant to a specific institutional guideline
must undertake one final inquiry: whether the regulation relied
248 See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
249 Evidence suggests that police perjury is disturbingly common in exclusionary
rule cases. See supra note 83.
250 For example, Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 418-23, suggest that
an examnation of the past record of the agent involved in Williams reveals a history
of attempts to stretch fourth amendment standards to the limit and beyond.
251 See supra text following note 234.
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upon was reasonably reflective of fourth amendment standards as
they existed when the officer acted. If the determination is.positive,
then the evidence is admissible; if negative, then it must be sup-
pressed. Because, as the institutional view of deterrence suggests,
internal police guidelines have a significant effect, on. police be-
havior,25 2 it is essential that the guidelines reflect fourth amendment
law accurately. If police policy -makers know that evidence seized
pursuant to any police regulation will be admissible under the new
good faith exception, then they will have no incentive to promul-
gate the kind of tough regulations necessary to force police officers
to conduct themselves as required by the Constitution.
In making its difficult determination regarding the "reasonable-
ness" of the regulation followed in a particular case, a court must
be sensitive to the effect its determination will have on police de-
partment incentive to promulgate regulations. Under the proposal,
if the court has progressed in its analysis to the point where evalua-
tion of the followed regulation is appropriate, it necessarily has
already determined that the police acted unconstitutionally.253 Ob-
viously, if the court takes the extreme view that-any regulation that
has permitted unconstitutional behavior is unreasonable, the police
will have little incentive to promulgate fourth amendment regula-
tions, because despite their presence the court will ultimately sup-
press all "good faith evidence." Deterrence will ultimately suffer.2
On the other hand, if the court takes the opposite position that any
regulation promulgated in subjective good faith by police policy
makers should be considered reasonable, no matter how inaccurately
it reflects fourth amendment law, then the police will write regula-
tions stretching the contours of the fourth amendment beyond
recognition, and the reformulated good faith exception will gut the
exclusionary rule.
With these countervailing considerations in mind, there appear
to be at least two situations in which the court should hold that a
regulation that has permitted unconstitutional behavior is never-
theless a reasonably accurate reflection of fourth amendment stand-
ards. First, because police regulation writers should not be required
252 See supra text accompanying notes 132-41.
2 53 See supra text accompanying notes 131, 236-38.
254 Because police regulations most effectively deter unlawful police conduct,
see supra text accompanying notes 132-41, and because some incentive is needed to
encourage the police to -write more regulations than presently exist, see supra notes
229-31, a good faith exception which does not encourage the promulgation of such
regulations will certainly not increase the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
as presently. structured, but will reduce its deterrent effect for the reasons, stated
supra at text accompanying notes 108-12.
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to anticipate new fourth amendment developments, courts should
,uphold- any -regulation- that accurately reflected fourth amendment
law as 'it existed when, the -conduct in question occurred. In some
.cases, such- as -Pettier,- 5 the new law will have been articulated be-
tween the time-of the offider's- conduct and the time the suppression
motion is decided. Ii- other cases; the court hearing the suppres-
ionr motion may believe its own determination that the officer's
conduct was.uncohstitutionl involves a novel interpretation of the
fourth amendment. In. both. situations, the court should hold that
-the -regulation -followed -is reasonable, and should thus deny the
defendant's suppression motion under the reformulated good faith
-exception.-"- .
:,-- Implicit in the court's holding, however, is the requirement
-that -the regulation in question- be amended to incorporate the
,.-ewly -announced fourth amendment principle. If the police do
not so amend their -regulation, :then a court faced with the same
regulation in the future must hold it to be unreasonable, and may
point to the first good faith decision as precedent. 6
- Appreciation of the difficulty of writing regulations that will
-elicit the proper response in all -conceivable situations 25 suggests
the second class of -cases in which a court should hold a police
regulation to be reasonable even though it permitted unconstitu-
tional police conduct in the case before the court. If a reasonably
specific police regulation accurately reflects prevailing fourth amend-
ment standards; but could reasonably have been understood by an
on-the-street officer to have permitted the unconstitutional action
taken, then the regulation should be deemed reasonable for the
limited purpose of permitting the use of the evidence seized in the
'case being considered.258 ' Once again, however, implicit in the
255422 U.S. 531 (1975).
256 As Professor Skolnick has stated, "[t]he standard, almost by definition, cannot
offer police more than one bite at the apple of a given good faith mistake. Police
could -scarcely, in good faith, say they made the same mistake twice." Skolnick,
supra note 17.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 245-46.
_58 For example, suppose a police officer believes that a warrantless search of
a suspect's apartment will uncover critical evidence that can be destroyed quickly
and easily, and his departmental training brings to his mind a regulation governing
consent searches. Assume that the regulation authorizes warrantless searches in the
circumstances 'cofifronting the officer only if the officer receives the full and voluntary
consent of a -party possessing the apparent authority to give consent to enter the
premises, and the regulation further requires that the officer must have articulable
reasonis to-,believe that-the "consenting.party in fact possesses the authority to consent
to the search. -This regulation acctrrately reflects fourth amendment requirements,
and should be 'deem6d reisonable;.een though it might authorize unconstitutional
behavior in some circumstances.
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court's holding -is thi requirement that. the regulali6n be' amended
so that, it cannot-reasonably" be understood in the future as permit-
ting:the type of unconstitutional conduct that occurred in .the case
being decided.259 If the: court believes that the regulation .en-
courages or unambiguously authorizes unconstitutional- beha:vior,
however, then it should be stricken as unreasonable and.'the evi-
dence seized should be 'suppressed.
,Concededly; the "reasonableness" of police regulations-.under
prevailing fourth amendment standards. will not always be easy for
a court to: evaluate objectively. However, the consequences of a
mistaken or poorly supported. reasonableness judgment- are not
nearly as serious under. the regulation-conscious good faith excep-
tion recommended as they are under the current Williams formu-
lktion. Under the Williams' formulation, poorly supported and
articulated reasonableness determinations will seriously reduce ihe
long-term deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, because police'
policy makers will not be given clear fourth amendment holdings
necessary to formulate institutional guidelines. 26 . The same cannot
be said of the regulation-conscious good faith exception advocated.
In addition, no matter how the court comes out in its good
faith determination, once it holds the conduct in question to have
been unconstitutional, police departments will have strong incen-
tives to rewrite the -regulation involved or to improve training
The facts of People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 937, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1981), provide such an example. In Adams, officers confronted with exigent cir-
cumstances obtained from the suspect's girlfriend consent to search the suspect's
apartment before beginning the search. The officers believed that the girlfriend
had the authority to consent to the search -because she provided -precise information-
about the location and interior contents of the apartment to be searched, possessed
a key to the premises, and claimed to be the suspect's girlfriend. These facts led
the police to believe she resided with the suspect and was thus consenting to. a
search of her own apartment. The police then conducted a search, which revealed
incriminating evidence. They would have been acting pursuant to the regulation
above, if it had existed. However,- the consenter did not reside at the suspect's
apartment, and thus did not have the actual authority to consent to the search.
A properly functioning good faith court confronted with these facts might believe
that the police should have asked the consenter whether she resided in the apart-
ment to be searched before they concluded that the consent was valid. Because
the police in the case described failed to make this inquiry, the court might hold
that the search was invalid and ihe police conduct was thus unconstitutional. -How-
ever, because the police followed a clearly applicable regulation in good faith and
believed that the consent wai valid, the court under the recommended good faith
analysis should not suppress the evidence uncovered.
259 For example, the regulation- discussed supra note 258 would have to be
amended to specify that the police must ask a third-party consenter Wvhether she
or he resides in the premises to be searched before concluding that the consenter
has the authority to consent to the search. If the regulation is not so amended,
then it must be stricken as unreasonable the next time it comes before the court in
a suppression case.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
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procedures. If the prosecution cannot meet the "objective", facet
of the reliance test-requiring that a specific and applicable regula-
tion be followed 261-then suppression will give the police the in-
centive to rewrite the regulation to make it more specific. If the
"subjective" facet of the reliance test is failed because the officer
cannot show that he actually relied on a regulation,262 then sup-
pression will give the police department the incentive to improve
its training program. Finally, if the prosecution cannot establish
that the regulation followed was reasonably reflective of fourth
amendment standards, 263 then suppression will provide the incentive
to rewrite the regulation to prevent the same result in the future.
Even if the prosecution meets both facets of the reliance test
and the regulation-reasonableness test, and hence successfully utilizes
the good faith exception in the case being decided, the police will
still have a strong incentive to rewrite the regulation involved.
The incentive remains because under the suggested formulation of
the good faith exception the police are only given "one bite"-a
regulation that permitted unconstitutional conduct but has never-
theless been deemed reasonable will not be deemed reasonable
again unless it is amended to prevent the type of conduct it per-
mitted once. Because police policy makers will want to take full
advantage of the regulation-conscious good faith exception in the
future, they will amend their regulations in response to court de-
cisions regardless of whether the evidence was suppressed.
Hence, fourth amendment law will not only continue to de-
velop, but it will be articulated through continually refined police
regulations. This process may have a more profound effect on
police behavior than even the current exclusionary rule, which
contains no good faith exception and no incentive for regulation-
writing. Further, because the courts under the reformulated good
faith exception will be reviewing police regulations directly, the
courts should have a greater impact than at present on the content
of those regulations. If the courts are sensitive to the threat that
overly strict reasonableness review can pose to police incentives to
promulgate regulations,2" then over time regulations will be pro-
mulgated and revised to be appropriately specific and understand-
able guidelines for on-the-street behavior.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
263 See supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
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GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION1
Some may contend that one overriding problem with the regu-
lation-conscious good faith exception proposed is that the police
simply do not have the resources or expertise necessary to promul-
gate comprehensive fourth amendment guidelines.2 6 5  However,
commentators, including at least one police officer, 266 have argued
for years that police regulations should and could be developed in
the fourth amendment area.267 In addition, some departments al-
ready have successfully promulgated regulations and developed
training programs on a limited scale,266 thus demonstrating that the
concept of fourth amendment regulations is not foreign to police
departments. Finally, at present the police have no compelling in-
centive to undertake massive regulation-writing efforts, which ex-
plains the lack of resources presently allocated to the task. But
the reformulated good faith exception will provide the heretofore
missing incentive because it will permit the use of probative evi-
dence obtained pursuant to regulations. It is hence not unrealistic
to expect police policy makers to try to take advantage of the new
good faith exception by increasing their regulation-writing efforts
dramatically.
Finally, some may contend that the recommended good faith
exception will be difficult for suppression courts to administer be-
cause of the multiple steps of analysis it requires.26 9 Concededly,
the new exception will require a more extended analysis than is
required under the exclusionary rule with no exception. How-
ever, the extra steps merely involve scrutinizing printed and easily
accessible police regulations, and the prosecution has the burden of
producing all the evidence necessary to prove the good faith defense;
therefore, there will be no need for massive discovery, and the
court's determinations will primarily be legal determinations. The
enormous benefits in long-term institutional deterrence and short-
term use of probative evidence provided by the reformulated good
faith exception far outweigh any inconvenience caused to suppres-
sion courts that may have to make a few additional legal determina-
tions in good faith cases.
265 See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 132, at 512 (describes practical obstacles to
police regulation-writing, although he ultimately concludes that regulations are
feasible).
266 See Hyman, supra note 126, at 55-61.
267 See authority cited supra note 228.
268 See supra note 229. :
269 See, e.g., commentators cited supra note 33.....
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V. CONCLUSION
Given the Supreme Court's current view of the source and
purpose of the exclusionary rule, the adoption of a broad good faith
exception seems likely.2 70 Several courts, most notably the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have already adopted some form of
a good faith exception. 27'1 Unfortunately, these courts have gen-
erally misunderstood how the exclusionary rule affects long-term
police behavior,272 and have consequently formulated a good faith
exception that will significantly reduce the deterrent effect of the
rule.
27 3
This Comment suggests that the exclusionary rule influences
police conduct primarily because of its effect on police policy makers
who in turn shape the behavior of individual officers. 274  Thus,
measures that will encourage the development of comprehensive
police regulations governing search and seizure activity are desir-
able. Regulations most effectively deter police officers from engag-
ing in unconstitutional conduct. The heretofore absent incentive
for the development of such regulations can be provided by a
properly structured good faith exception, one that rewards police
departments that promulgate comprehensive fourth amendment
regulations. The proposed structure rewards such departments by
permitting the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence only if
it was seized pursuant to a concrete institutional guideline.
275
Precedential support for the regulation-conscious good faith
exception proposed can be found in Supreme Court cases that have
permitted the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence seized in
reliance on later-invalidated court precedents or statutes.2 7 6 Finally,
the understanding of the institutional basis of deterrence suggests a
way to formulate the regulation-conscious good faith exception that
will permit the use of more probative evidence while encouraging,
not retarding, the development of practical fourth amendment
standards.217
2 70 See supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
271 See supra notes 3, 8-15.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 74-77, 114-45.
273 See supra text accompanying notes 108-12, 142-46.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 117-41.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 147-54, 233-64.
276 See supra text accompanying notes 155-90.
277 See supra text accompanying notes 147-54, 233-64.
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